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This dissertation consists of two chapters that investigate earnings management through the 
recognition of bargain purchase gains in the banking industry and in other industries. 
Chapter 1   In business acquisitions where the fair value of net assets acquired exceeds the 
consideration paid, acquiring firms recognize bargain purchase gains under ASC 805. The 
determination of the fair value of net assets at date of acquisition gives acquiring management 
considerable flexibility in judgments. In this chapter, I focus on bargain purchase acquisitions in 
the banking industry, and find that acquirer utilizes bargain purchase gains to avoid negative 
earnings and earnings decline. The reason for such transactions appears to be level-3 fair value 
estimates of FDIC loss share receivable acquired at date of acquisition. 
Chapter 2    This chapter analyzes earnings management through bargain purchase gains in non-
financial industries. The new accounting standard (FASB ASC 805) requires acquiring firms to 
estimate the fair value of net assets acquired and recognize the excess amount over purchase 
price as a bargain purchase gain, a component of current earnings. The flexibility in fair value 
measurement provides acquiring management with discretion to determine the amount of the 
bargain purchase gain. By investigating the association between bargain purchase gains and 
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acquirers’ earning performance, I find that bargain purchase gains have consistently been used 
for earnings management purposes and that level-3 fair value estimates of intangible assets 
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Bank Earnings Management and Bargain Purchase Gains: The 
Case of Fair Value Estimates 
1.1 Introduction  
      In December 2007, the FASB issued Accounting Standards Codification™ (ASC) 805, 
Business Combinations (formerly FASB Statement 141, Business Combinations). Prior to ASC 
805, in business acquisitions where the fair value of net assets acquired exceeds the purchase 
consideration paid, acquiring firms recognize the excess amount as negative goodwill. Negative 
goodwill is first used to set off the fair value assigned to certain non-monetary assets acquired 
that are typically hard to value, such as property, plant, equipment, and intangibles. After the fair 
value of those hard-to-value assets is reduced to zero, any remaining amount of negative 
goodwill would be recognized in the acquirer’s income statement as an extraordinary gain. ASC 
805 specifies that the entire amount of negative goodwill is no longer used to reduce the fair 
value of certain assets acquired, but is reported as a bargain purchase gain (“BPG”), which is a 
component of income from continuing operations. Presumably, there are few instances where a 
business is sold for amounts below the fair value of the net assets being sold. However, the 
determination of the fair value of net assets at date of acquisition gives the acquiring 
management considerable flexibility in judgments surrounding the fair values assigned to those 
assets.  
      In my preliminary analysis, I find that bargain purchase transactions are not so rare. My 
sample identifies 412 bargain purchase acquisitions over the period 2008 through 2012, resulting 
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in day one gains. This leads to questions of whether acquiring firms utilize BPGs to manage 
earnings, and if so, what are the mechanics for achieving such gains. Prior literature studies how 
firms use their accounting choices to manage earnings. Hand (1989) suggests that firms use the 
accounting-based reported earnings gain from debt-equity swaps to offset an unexpected and 
transitory decrease in earnings. Haw, Jung and Lilien (1991) shows that firms use pension gains 
from curtailment of defined pension plans to similarly smooth a decline in reported earnings. The 
curtailments are accounting transactions without cash consequences. A large recent literature 
examines whether firms use the flexibility in fair value accounting to manage earnings.  Given 
the context of business acquisitions, the primary fair value judgment appears to be estimates of 
intangible assets for non-financial acquiring firms. Shalev et al. (2013) looks at acquisitions 
where the consideration paid exceeds the fair value of net assets acquired, resulting in positive 
goodwill. The new standard on expensing goodwill requires periodic testing of impairment based 
on models of future cash flows. Shalev et al. (2013) finds that managers are more likely to assign 
value to goodwill rather than other classes of assets which are depreciated on a systematic basis. 
By doing so, managers are able to control future expense through the judicious choice of 
estimates that determine whether goodwill has been impaired. In other words, Shalev et al. (2013) 
argues that assigning larger amounts to goodwill allows the manager greater discretion over 
expenses, and thereby, their compensation. 
       Interestingly, of bargain purchase transactions roughly half are in the banking industry. 
These 204 bargain purchase transactions in my sample take approximately 12.15% of total 
acquisitions performed by public banks. This suggests that the accounting for BPG has the 
potential to be important for the banks engage in these transactions, and that the banks that 
engage in bargain purchase transactions are potentially important in the economy. In the banking 
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industry, the use of fair value accounting is much more prevalent than other industries. Most 
assets in banks’ balance sheets are valued based on managers’ internal information and 
estimation such as projected cash flows, discount rates, royalty rates, and remaining useful live, 
which are considered level-3 unobservable inputs and can differ materially from actual results. 
The existing literature shows that bank managers use their discretions in recognized fair value 
gains on available-for-sale assets (Barth et al. 2015) and gains from asset securitization (Dechow 
et al. 2010) to smooth earnings. In bank acquisitions, the primary fair value estimate seems to be 
the carrying amount of loans and mortgages transferred at date of acquisition. Moreover, many 
of these acquisitions are assisted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), which 
is a United States government corporation operating as an independent agency. Under the FDIC-
assisted transaction process, the acquiring banks may enter into loss sharing agreements with the 
FDIC under which the FDIC will reimburse the bank for part of eligible losses with respect to 
covered assets. The expected reimbursements under the loss sharing agreements are recorded as 
FDIC loss share receivable (or FDIC Indemnification assets) at their estimated fair value, which 
reflects estimate of the amount and timing of the expected future cash flows to be received from 
the FDIC under the loss-sharing agreement. The assumptions used in estimating the fair value of 
FDIC loss share receivable should be consistent with those used to estimate the fair value of 
covered assets. If there is a decrease in expected cash flows from the FDIC on FDIC loss share 
receivable in subsequent years, acquiring banks should recognize an impairment of FDIC loss 
share receivable and a charge to noninterest income. If the initially estimated losses on covered 
assets are overstated and the actual realized losses are less when loss-sharing ends, the loss 
sharing agreement may require acquiring institution to reimburse the FDIC.  
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      The accounting treatment for bargain purchase acquisitions provides a new opportunity for 
acquiring firms to engage in earnings management by making discretionary fair value estimates 
for net assets acquired. My primary research interests surround investigating acquiring banks’ 
earning management activities using BPGs and understanding reasons for BPGs. Is it discretion 
in fair value estimates or, alternatively, is the acquiring management successful in negotiating a 
favorable business acquisition? Is the FDIC receivable being overvalued or is the FDIC simply 
folding one failed bank into a healthier bank? To answer these questions, I identify Form 10-K 
filings containing business acquisitions with BPGs by a keyword search on EDGAR Online I-
Metrix. I read each Form 10-K over the period 2008-2012 to collect the fair value of assets 
acquired, liabilities assumed, and other acquisition deal characteristics. Missing financial 
information within Compustat, CRSP, and PrivCo1 for either the acquiring or target firm reduces 
the sample size to 204 deals in the banking industry. I employ a pair-match control group of 204 
bank acquisitions that with goodwill recognized. 
      I begin by investigating whether acquiring managers exercise their discretion obtained from 
ASC 805 to manipulate the amount of BPGs. My preliminary analysis suggests that, in bargain 
purchase transactions, the level-3 fair value estimate of FDIC loss share receivable constitutes a 
significant share of the total assets acquired2, which is a potential tool for acquiring banks to 
manipulate. However, the manipulation is not costless: acquiring managers are motivated to 
report larger BPGs when the expected benefits are higher. Following Dechow et al. (2010) and 
Barth et al. (2015), I assume that acquiring managers’ incentives to manipulate BPGs are 
relatively strong when the earnings before BPGs are low or below prior year’s level. Consistent 
                                                          
1 Untabulated statistics based on my sample banks reveal that approximately 77% of targets are private firms, so I 
obtain financial data for those private targets from PrivCo.  




with my prediction, the empirical results show that BPGs are negatively related to earnings 
before BPGs and changes in earnings before BPGs. 
      Next, I examine whether acquiring banks intentionally overestimate the level-3 fair value of 
FDIC receivable to inflate the amount of BPGs. By adding a control variable of the level-3 fair 
value estimates of FDIC loss share receivable, I find a significantly positive relation between the 
amount of BPG realized and the level-3 fair value estimate of FDIC receivable. I also find that 
the negative relation between BPG and earnings before BPG is more pronounced when the level-
3 fair value estimate of FDIC receivable is higher, indicating that banks smooth earnings more 
when they have more opportunity to engage in smoothing. 
      It is unclear that whether acquiring banks enter the transaction with sole purpose of managing 
their earnings, or the conjectured overstatement happens after the fact. I adopt Heckman (1978) 
two-stage model to explicitly account for the drivers and characteristics of acquisitions. I reject a 
null hypothesis that banks are randomly choosing to acquire a target in the first stage. The results 
of earnings management through reporting BPGs still hold in the second stage, suggesting that 
acquiring banks make discretionary fair value estimates to manage earning after the decision to 
acquire.  
      If acquiring banks intentionally overestimate the fair value of FDIC loss share receivable 
acquired, they are more likely to recognize a future impairment to FDIC loss share receivable 
and a charge to other noninterest income in subsequent years. As an additional analysis, I 
perform a time-series analysis of FDIC loss share receivable and other noninterest income for 
BPG group and control group. The analysis confirms the increasing pattern of impairment and 
the decreasing trend of other noninterest income for BPG firms compared to goodwill firms, 
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suggesting that BPG firms suffer the cost of earnings management in the years following bargain 
purchase acquisitions.  
      An alternative explanation of my result is that the acquired bank was in very poor state, 
especially in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, hence the acquisition was effectively 
induced by the FDIC and the BPG reflects the economics of the result. To exclude this potential 
explanation, I drop the observations in 2008 and 2009 and run the main tests again. The 
regression results still hold, suggesting that it is the acquiring banks’ earnings management 
incentive, not the economic reason, driving the recognition of BPG. 
      This chapter contributes to the literature on bank earnings management (Dechow et al. 2010; 
Barth et al. 2015). I use a unique setting, where revised accounting standards allows for the 
recognition of a day one gain, to suggest that acquiring banks utilize BPGs to influence earnings. 
My results provide supporting evidence that the reason for achieving BPGs is acquiring 
managers’ discretionary fair value estimates of FDIC loss share receivable. There is a concurrent 
study which is most related to this chapter. Dunn, Kohlbeck, and Smith (2015) examines the 
earnings management in 2010 and 2011 FDIC-assisted bank acquisitions and the market 
reactions to BPGs. This chapter extends the sample years from 2008 to 2012, and has a different 
focus on discussing the important role of fair value estimates in achieving BPGs. 
      This chapter calls for the users of financial statements to pay attention to firms involved with 
bargain purchase acquisitions because they may have incentives and ability to manipulate 
earnings. Also, while regulators consider that the changes in ASC 805 improve the 
informativeness and faithfulness of financial statements, this paper questions the quality of fair 
values assigned to net assets acquired and the amount of BPGs. 
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      The remainder of this paper is as follows. Next section provides a background for bargain 
purchase acquisitions. Section 1.3 reviews the previous literature and develops testable 
hypotheses. Section 1.4 describes research design, and Section 1.5 shows the sample selection 
and data description. In Section 1.6, I show the empirical results. Section 1.7 discusses the 
conclusions and implications of our findings. 
1.2 Background 
      In a bargain purchase acquisition, the acquiring firm is required to allocate the purchase price 
to assets and liabilities based on their estimated fair values at date of acquisition. The fair values 
of net assets acquired can be determined with assistance from outside consultants and use fair 
value methodologies in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. The excess of 
fair value of the net assets acquired over the purchase price was recorded as a BPG and is shown 
as a separate component of earnings in the acquiring firm’s income statement.  
      The FASB issued SFAS No. 157 Fair Value Measurements in September 2006, which 
“defines fair value, establishes a framework for measuring fair value, and expands disclosures 
about fair value measurements” (SFAS 157, P.8 paragraph 1). The framework uses 3-level fair 
value hierarchy to reflect the level of judgment involved in estimating fair values:  
      “Level 1 inputs are quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets or 
liabilities that the reporting entity has the ability to access at the measurement date... Level 2 
inputs are inputs other than quoted prices included within Level 1 that are observable for the 
asset or liability, either directly or indirectly… Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs for the 
asset or liability… unobservable inputs shall reflect the reporting entity’s own assumptions about 
the assumptions that market participants would use in pricing the asset or liability (including 
assumptions about risk).” (SFAS 157, P.12 paragraph 3, 7; P.15 paragraph 2)  
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      This standard gives the highest priority to Level-1 fair value and the lowest priority to Level-
3, but does not provide implementation guidance on how to incorporate management judgments 
in arriving at fair values. Given this, acquiring firms have subjectivity in fair value accounting 
and the recognition of BPGs. 
      In the banking industry, around 69.14% of bargain purchase acquisitions are assisted by the 
FDIC. When an acquiring institution has entered into a loss-sharing agreement the FDIC in 
connection with an acquisition of a failed financial institution, the assets covered by the loss-
sharing agreement should be recorded in their respective balance sheet categories. At the same 
time, the acquiring institution should estimate the amount and timing of the expected future cash 
flows to be received from the FDIC under the agreement, and record it as FDIC loss share 
receivables. If there is a decrease in expected cash flows from the FDIC in subsequent years, 
acquiring banks should impair FDIC loss share receivable and recognize a charge to other 
noninterest income. If the initially estimated losses on covered assets are overstated and the 
actual realized losses are less when loss-sharing ends, the loss sharing agreement may require 
acquiring institution to reimburse the FDIC. 
      To better understand bargain purchase acquisitions, Appendix 1.1 presents an example of 
FDIC-assisted acquisition. On June 19, 2009, First Bancorp had entered into a purchase and 
assumption agreement with the FDIC, as a receiver for Cooperative Bank, Wilmington, North 
Carolina. The following information is disclosed in First Bancorp’s Form 10-K for the fiscal year 
of 2009. 
      “According to the terms of the agreement, First Bank acquired all deposits (except certain 
brokered deposits) and borrowings, and substantially all of the assets of Cooperative Bank and 
its subsidiary, Lumina Mortgage. The loans and foreclosed real estate purchased are covered by 
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two loss share agreements between the FDIC and First Bank, which afford First Bank significant 
loss protection. Under the loss share agreements, the FDIC will cover 80% of covered loan and 
foreclosed real estate losses up to $303 million and 95% of losses in excess of that amount.  The 
term for loss sharing on residential real estate loans is ten years, while the term for loss sharing 
on non-residential real estate loans is five years in respect to losses and eight years in respect to 
loss recoveries. The reimbursable losses from the FDIC are based on the book value of the 
relevant loan as determined by the FDIC at the date of the transaction.” 
      As a result of this acquisition, First Bancorp reports $916,048,000 in assets acquired and 
$873,913,000 in liabilities assumed at fair value. At the date of acquisition, First Bancorp wrote 
down Cooperative Bank’s book value of loans from $828,957,000 to the estimated fair value of 
$601,104,000 as a result of future expected loan losses. With regard to the fair value adjustment 
for FDIC loss share receivable, First Bancorp states that the write up of $185,112,000 represents 
the amount that the company will receive from the FDIC under its loss share agreement as a 
result of future loan losses. The application of acquisition accounting results in a bargain 
purchase gain of $67,894,000, which is included in the Consolidated Statement of Operations for 
the year ended December 31, 2009.  
      This example demonstrates that BPG has a significant impact on First Bancorp’s financial 
statement. BPG is 2.46% of First Bancorp’s total assets in the preceding year. At the same time, 
the fair value estimate of FDIC loss share receivable has been put in the spotlight as it makes up 
a large portion of the total assets acquired (20.21%) in bargain purchase acquisition and is the 
source of BPG (272.65%). Another interesting finding is that First Bancorp received cash of 
$25,759,000 from the FDIC instead of transferring purchase price at date of acquisition, which is 
commonplace in bank bargain purchase acquisitions assisted by the FDIC.  
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1.3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
      This study follows two streams of literature: (1) literature on earnings management; (2) 
literature on fair value accounting. 
1.3.1 Earnings Management 
      Empire-building literature shows that banks have incentives to manipulate earnings data. 
First, bank management can use reported earnings to signal good quality of their business to 
financial statements users (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Ahmed et al., 1999; Dechow et al. 
2010). Second, managers are motivated to misrepresent earnings to affect accounting-based 
compensation and contracting (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
      Banks have various discretionary choices to affect earnings. Relative to other accruals, the 
loan loss provision is the most prevalent and typically largest bank accrual (Beatty and Liao, 
2014).  A large literature emphasizes bank earnings management through discretion in the loan 
loss provision. Beatty et al. (2002) finds that public banks are more likely to use discretionary 
loan loss provision to avoid small earnings decreases than private banks. Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2004) documents that bank managers make discretionary estimates for loan loss provision to 
reduce earnings volatility. Anandarajan et al. (2007) finds that earnings management behavior 
using loan loss provision is more aggressive in Australia after the implementation of Basel.  
      An alternative reporting choice, recognition of securities gains and losses, has also been 
investigated frequently. Beatty et al. (1995) finds that banks alter the timing and magnitude of 
securities gain and loss recognition to achieve desired accounting outcomes. Similarly, Collins et 




      Bank manager may also use other accruals to manage their reported earnings. For example, 
Ramesh and Revsine (2000) finds that banks strategically choose the implementation method for 
SFAS 106 and the adoption time of SFAS 106 and SAFS 109 to achieve earnings benefits. 
Schrand and Wong (2003) finds that well capitalized banks adjust the valuation allowances 
against deferred tax assets to smooth earnings. Kilic et al. (2012) finds that banks use loan loss 
provisions as substitutes for derivatives for earnings management purpose. 
1.3.2 Fair Value Accounting 
      The debate over fair value accounting has been ongoing for decades. Existing literature 
primarily focuses on the relevance and reliability of fair value estimates. On the one hand, 
proponents of fair value argue that fair value estimates are generally value-relevant over and 
above historical cost figures in providing more transparent and timely information to investors 
(Barth et al, 1996; Carroll et al, 2003). On the other hand, opponents of fair value argue that the 
reliability of fair value can be questionable, as managers have incentives and opportunity to bias 
reported values (Barth 1994; Barth et al. 1996; Danbolt and Rees, 2008). When the reliance on 
managerial judgment and estimates in the determination of fair value opens a door to intentional 
bias, mark-to-model (levels 2 and 3) fair value are considered less reliable than mark-to-market 
(Level 1) fair value (Martin et al. 2006; Ronen, 2008; Kolev, 2009).  
      The banking industry has been a primary focus of the fair value literature, because banks use 
financial instruments, which are subject to fair value accounting, much more than industrial 
companies. Recent studies show that bank managers use their discretion in fair value gains 
recognized on available-for-sale assets (Barth et al. 2015) and gains from asset securitization 
(Dechow et al. 2010) to smooth earnings. 
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      In business acquisitions, FASB ASC 805 requires the acquiring bank to recognize at the 
acquisition date all assets and liabilities assumed at their fair values. Any excess of the purchase 
price over amounts allocated to fair value of net assets is recorded as goodwill. Where amounts 
allocated to assets acquired and liabilities assumed is greater than the purchase price, a bargain 
purchase gain is recognized. Most bank acquisitions in my sample are assisted by FDIC, where 
the level-3 fair value estimate of FDIC loss share receivable is a significant share of the total 
assets acquired, suggesting a potential tool for acquiring banks to manipulate or manage net 
assets recorded at the acquisition date. Motivated by the critiques and concerns regarding fair 
value estimates, this chapter investigates acquiring banks’ earnings management incentives and 
the impact of level-3 fair value estimates on the recognition of BPG.   
      Opportunistically realized BPG can influence reported earnings, but it is not costless: 
managers need to overestimate fair value of net assets acquired to affect earnings to an 
economically meaningful extent, thus the possibility of amortization and impairment will 
increase in following years. Managers will time the recognition of discretionary BPGs to periods 
in which the benefits are larger. Following Dechow et al. (2010) and Barth et al. (2015), I expect 
that the benefits of discretionary BPGs are relatively large when the pre-managed earnings are 
lower, or when the pre-managed earnings are lower than prior year’s level. 
      H1: There is a negative correlation between BPGs and earnings before the effect of 
BPGs. 
      H2: There is a negative correlation between BPGs and changes in earnings before the 
effect of BPGs. 
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      If FDIC loss share receivable is valued intentionally, I expect that the level-3 fair value of 
FDIC loss share receivable should be related to the intensity of earnings management. 
      H3: There is a positive correlation between the magnitude of the earnings effects in H1 
and H2 and the level-3 fair value estimates of FDIC receivable.  
1.4 Research Design 
     In this section, I discuss the research methodology and variable construction. I expect that 
acquiring manager’s incentives to smooth earnings are relatively strong when earnings before 
BPGs are low or fall short of prior year earnings. To test Hypothesis 1, I employ the following 
model: 
                         BPGaini,t=αi,t+β1 NIBBi,t+βi Controls +εi,t                                                     (1) 
      Where εi,t is an error term, and: 
- BPGaini,t = bargain purchase gain deflated by prior year total assets. 
- NIBBi,t = net income before taxes and bargain purchase gain, deflated by prior year total 
assets.  
      As the BPG of goodwill acquisitions is denoted as zero, the depended variable is censored on 
the left side. To validate my results, I include both OLS model and Tobit model and arrive at 
similar estimates. 
      Existing studies provide limited guidance for the determinants of BPG. Following literature 
on price premium paid in business combinations (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), I include 
acquiring firm’s and target’s characteristics in the year preceding the transaction, and acquisition 
characteristics as control variables. 
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- Sizei,t-1 = the natural logarithm of the acquiring bank’s total assets. 
- Altmani,t-1= Acquiring bank’s Altman z-score. 
- Target_sizei,t-1= the natural logarithm of the target's total assets. 
- Target_nii,t-1 = target's net income before interest and taxes over total assets. 
- Relsizei,t-1 = the ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size. 
- FDICi,t = 1 if the acquisition is assisted by FDIC, = 0 otherwise. 
- FDIC_receivablei,t = the level-3 fair value estimate of FDIC receivables acquired over the 
total assets acquired. 
- Paymenti,t = 1 if the acquisition is paid by cash, and 0 otherwise. 
      Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative association between the amount of BPGs and the change in 
earnings before the effect of BPGs. Following Dechow et al. (2010), I use the following 
OLS/Tobit regression model: 
                      BPGaini,t=αi,t+β1 ΔNIBBi,t+βi Controls +εi,t                                                     (2) 
      Where εi,t is an error term, and: 
- BPGaini,t = bargain purchase gain deflated by prior year total assets. 
- ΔNIBBi,t = the change in net income before taxes and bargain purchase gain, deflated by 
prior year total assets.  
- Sizei,t-1 = the natural logarithm of the acquiring bank’s total assets. 
- Altmani,t-1= Acquiring bank’s Altman z-score. 
- Target_sizei,t-1= the natural logarithm of the target's total assets. 
- Target_nii,t-1 = target's net income before interest and taxes over total assets. 
- Relsizei,t-1 = the ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size. 
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- FDICi,t = 1 if the acquisition is assisted by FDIC, = 0 otherwise. 
- FDIC_receivablei,t = the level-3 fair value estimate of FDIC receivables acquired over the 
total assets acquired. 
- Paymenti,t = 1 if the acquisition is paid by cash, and 0 otherwise. 
     To examine whether acquiring banks use the fair value estimates of FDIC loss share 
receivable to inflate the amount of BPG, I add FDIC_receivable as a control in Model (1) and 
Model (2) and expect a positive relation between it and the amount of BPGain. 
      In Hypothesis 3, to test whether the level-3 fair value estimates of FDIC receivable provide 
acquiring banks an opportunity to manage earnings through recognition of BPG, I estimate the 
following Tobit model: 
      BPGaini,t=αi,t+β1 NIBBi,t+β2ΔNIBBi,t+ β3 FDIC_receivablei,t+β4 NIBBi,t*FDIC_receivablei,t    
                          +β5ΔNIBBi,t*FDIC_receivablei,t +βi Controls +εi,t                                                            (3) 
      I expect that the coefficients on two interactions are significantly negative, suggesting that 
acquiring banks with higher level-3 fair value estimates of FDIC loss share receivable smooth 
earnings more. 
      Model (1), Model (2), and Model (3) are a joint test of the decision to acquire and the 
incentive to manage earnings through recognition of BPG, so I conduct a Heckman two-stage 
model to explicitly separate the two tests. In the first stage, I estimate the following probit 
regression of bank’s decision to acquire a target: 
Probit(Acqi,t)= α+β1 Sizei,t-1+β2 Tobin_Qi,t-1 +β3 Cash Flowi,t-1 
+β4 Reti,t-1+ β5 NIi,t-1 +εi,t           (4) 
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      Where εi,t is an error term, and: 
- Acqi,t = 1 if the acquiring firm announce an acquisition, and 0 otherwise. 
- Sizei,t-1 = the natural logarithm of acquiring firm's total assets. 
- Tobin_Qi,t-1 = the market value of asset over book value of assets. 
- Cash flowi,t-1 = earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by 
market capitalization. 
- Reti,t-1 = cumulative monthly returns. 
- NIi,t-1 = earnings before extraordinary items deflated by prior year's total assets. 
      Following Yim (2013), I include firms’ size, market to book ratio, cash flow, annual stock 
return, and profitability as determinants of acquisition occurrence. Consistent with prior 
literature, the coefficients on all variables are expected to be significantly positive. 
      In the second stage, I estimate the following equation, and include the inverse Mill’s ratio 
(IMR) calculated based on estimation results from Equation (4): 
     BPGaini,t=αi,t+β1 NIBBi,t+β2ΔNIBBi,t+ β3 FDIC_receivablei,t+β4 NIBBi,t*FDIC_receivablei,t    
           +β5ΔNIBBi,t*FDIC_receivablei,t +β6 IMR + βi Controls +εi,t                                                            (5) 
      I expect that the coefficients on earnings before BPG and changes in earnings before BPG 
are still negative and significant, indicating that the acquiring banks use BPGs to manage 
earnings after the decision to acquire. The coefficients on the two interactions are expected to be 
significantly negative. 
1.5 Data Description 
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      The revised FASB ASC 805 became effective for acquisitions completed during annual 
reporting periods that begin on or after December 15, 2008 and requires detailed disclosures. My 
sample comprises all bargain purchase acquisitions made by banks and completed between 
December 15, 2008 and December 31, 2012. I use a keyword search for the words “bargain 
purchase”, “gain from acquisition”, or “gain on acquisition” to identify Form 10-k reporting 
bargain purchase acquisitions through I-Metrix by Edgar Online. I read disclosure notes for 
acquisitions in each Form 10-k and hand collect deal characteristics including acquisition 
completion date, amount of BPG realized, fair value estimates of net assets acquired, and 
purchase consideration paid. I further restrict the sample to acquiring banks with stock and 
financial data in The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat. Additional 
financial data of targets are obtained from Compustat or PrivCo. The final sample consists of 204 
bargain purchase acquisitions in the banking industry. Table 1.1 reports the sample selection and 
a breakdown of the number of acquisitions taken by BPG banks. 77.35% of BPG banks were 
involved in a single acquisition within one firm-year, and 22.65% of banks acquire multiple 
targets within one firm year. 
      To construct a control group, I collect data on goodwill acquisitions from Thomson’s SDC 
Plantinum database. I match each deal to a bargain purchase acquisition using acquiring bank’s 
size and acquisition year, and include stock and financial data from CRSP and Compustat. The 
final control sample consists of 204 goodwill acquisitions. I denote the BPGs of these 
observations as zero. 
      Table 1.2, Panel A reports the distribution of bargain purchase acquisitions in the banking 
industry and banks recognizing BPGs by calendar year. The occurrence of bargain purchase 
acquisitions is spreading evenly over the sample period after 2008, with a slightly higher 
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concentration in 2010 (33.33%). Specifically, I don’t observe more bargain purchase acquisition 
during the financial crisis period. Panel B presents the distribution of bargain purchase 
acquisitions by quarter. Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) has documented that earnings 
management transactions are more likely to occur within the last few days of the quarter. The 
higher frequency of bargain purchase acquisitions in the 4th quarter (31.67%) of the year 
confirms the findings in prior studies.  
      Table 1.3 represents the distributional statistics for BPGs, earnings, and deal characteristics I 
use in my estimating equations. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 
1%. This table reveals several notable differences between BPG acquisitions and GDWL 
acquisitions. For BPG acquisitions, acquiring banks realize BPG (mean BPG =1.17); the median 
is 0.29. For GDWL acquisitions, this variable is denoted as zero for all observations. The mean 
(median) net income before taxes and BPGs deflated by total assets, NIBB, equals 0.0057 
(0.0136) for BPG group, 0.0289 (0.0225) for GDWL group. ΔNIBB is denoted as the change in 
NIBB from the current year to previous year. The mean (median) ΔNIBB is 0.0023 (0.0014) for 
BPG group, 0.0076 (0.0036) for GDWL group. After excluding the effect of BPGs, around 20.69% 
of banks in BPG group report a negative net income (4.62% in GDWL group), and 42.86% 
report an earnings decline in acquisition year (17.34% in GDWL group). The results show that 
the average net income of BPG firms (0.0180) is slightly weaker than GDWL firms (0.0289) 
including the effect of BPG, but without the effect of BPGs, the difference between BPG group 
and GDWL group is more significantly pronounced. 
      Around 69.14% of bargain purchase acquisitions are assisted by the FDIC, while only 17.75% 
of goodwill acquisitions are directed by the FDIC. FDIC_receivable is defined as the level-3 fair 
value estimate of FDIC loss share receivable, deflated by the fair value of total assets acquired. 
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Consistent with my expectation, the fair value estimate of FDIC receivable represents a 
significant portion of total assets acquired for bargain purchase acquisitions (10.48%), and makes 
up a lower proportion for goodwill acquisitions (2.52%). There are two possible interpretations 
of the results: (1) the target is in a very poor state, hence the bargain purchase acquisition is 
effectively induced by the FDIC and the bargain purchase gain reflects the economics of the 
transaction. (2) Acquiring banks use the discretion in level-3 fair value estimates to achieve 
financial reporting goals. To address this issue, I add a control variable Target_ni in regressions 
and drop observations in financial crisis period. Target_ni is defined as the target’s ROA in the 
year preceding the acquisition. The mean (median) Target_ni is -0.1435 (-0.0447) for bargain 
purchase acquisitions, and -0.0454 (0.0007) for goodwill acquisitions. The earnings performance 
of targets in bargain purchase acquisition is weaker than those in goodwill acquisitions, but the 
difference is insignificant. 
1.6 Empirical Results 
    1.6.1 Earnings Management 
    1.6.1.1 The association between BPG and NIBB 
      In bargain purchase acquisitions, acquiring firms can immediately recognize the excess 
amount of fair value of net assets acquiring over purchase price paid as current earnings. 
Following Haw, Jung, and Lilien (1991), I examine the time-series trend of earnings 
performance of banks reporting BPGs and that of banks reporting goodwill. Table 1.4 presents 
the mean and median values of earnings per share (EPS) and return on equity (ROE) over the 
years from t=-3 through t=+1 (t=0 if the acquisition year). The z-statistic represents Wilcoxon 
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singed ranks z-value for the change in earning variable between the current and the preceding 
year. 
      For banks in the BPG group, the median EPS increases steadily from year -3 to year +1. 
However, if the effect of BPG is excluded in acquisition year, the median EPS would have 
dropped from $0.5000 in the preceding year to %0.2677. The Wilcoxon signed ranks z-value 
shows that the sudden drop is significant at 1% level. At the same time, the median EPS is 
$0.7600 in the year following bargain purchase acquisition, which is close to prior year’s level. 
For banks recognizing goodwill in acquisitions, there is no earnings decrease over the sample 
period. 
        The analysis of ROE variable presents a similar result. For banks in BPG group, ROE 
shows an increasing pattern from year -1 to year +1. In the transaction year, the ROE excluding 
BPG is lower than that of the preceding year, while the increasing trend remains if BPG is 
included. Again, for banks in goodwill group, the same variable is steadily increasing from year -
1 to year +1 and I do not observe any significant drop. This finding suggests acquiring banks 
undertake bargain purchase acquisitions to offset a decline in earnings. 
      Following Hand (1989), I plot the time-series of net income versus net income without the 
effect of BPGs from year -3 to year +3. Figure 1.1 presents the time series of average NI versus 
NIBB, while Figure 1.2 plots the time-series of 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of NI versus 
NIBB. The NI is denoted by solid line, whereas the denoted NIBB is joined by dotted line. 
      It is hypothesized that ASC 805 offers acquiring firms a previously unavailable opportunity 
to recognize a day one income in acquisition year. Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 exhibit that 
acquiring managers use the amount of BPGs reported to smooth an unexpected and transitory 
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decrease in the time-series of earnings: for the average and all three percentiles reported, 
acquiring banks’ NI exhibits a transitory decrease in the transaction year when the BPGs are 
excluded (NIBB). NI in the transaction year is much closer to earnings one year prior and one 
year behind if BPGs are included than if BPGs are excluded.  
      Table 1.5 investigates the relationship between BPGs and the incentive to manage earnings 
and shows the standard OLS results and Tobit results of model (1). In regression (1), I assume 
that the entire amount of BPGs is discretionary. Consistent with H1, the coefficient on NIBBi,t is 
statistically negative and significant for both regressions (OLS: -0.0586, P<0.01; Tobit: -0.0841, 
P<0.01), indicating that BPGs are larger when earnings before the effect of BPGs are lower. In 
regression (2), I add various control variables to isolate the discretionary component of BPGs. 
Consistent with predictions, both sets of findings reveal that the discretionary amount of BPG is 
significantly negatively related to NIBB (OLS: -0.1298, P<0.01; Tobit: -0.4368, P<0.01). 
Specifically, the estimated coefficient on target_ni is insignificant across all regressions, 
rejecting the potential explanation that the target’s financial distress is the main reason for 
achieving BPGs. The significantly negative coefficient on acquiring banks’ size and the positive 
coefficient on acquiring banks’ altman z-score provide evidence that smaller and weaker banks 
recognize larger amount of BPGs. In regression (3), I replace the dummy variable FDIC with 
FDIC_receivable. The positive relation between BPGain and FDIC_receivable indicates that the 
level-3 fair value estimate of FDIC loss share receivable contributes significantly to the amount 
of BPG.  
      In Table 1.6, I split my sample into positive NIBB subsample and negative NIBB subsample 
and run Tobit regression in both groups. The Tobit estimation shows that the coefficient on 
NIBB is insignificant (-0.0744; P>0.1) in positive NIBB subsample, which contains 305 
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observations. After adding controls in regression (3), the coefficient on NIBB becomes 
significantly negative, but only at 5% level. In negative NIBB subgroup, however, the coefficient 
on NIBB is consistently significant and negative across all regressions, and the magnitude is 
larger compared to the positive subgroup. This finding reveals that firms with negative earnings 
before BPGs realize larger amount of BPGs, which is consistent with earnings smoothing. The 
positive relation between BPGain and FDIC_receivable is statistically significant in both positive 
(0.0116, P<0.05) and negative subsamples (0.0317, P<0.1), indicating the inflation effect of 
level-3 fair value estimates of FDIC loss share receivable on the recognized amount of BPGs. 
    1.6.1.2 The association between BPG and ΔNIBB 
      On the second hypothesis, Figure 1.3 shows the time-series comparison of average ΔNI 
versus ΔNIBB, and Figure 1.4 plots the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of ΔNI versus ΔNIBB 
over a seven-year period centered on the transaction year. It is hypothesized that acquiring 
managers’ motivations are stronger when NIBB is below prior year’s level. Figure 1.3 and 
Figure 1.4 shows that the average change in NIBB is slightly negative, but becomes positive 
after BPGs are conducted, as well as the median change in NIBB. This supports my prediction 
that acquiring banks’ earnings fall below prior year’s level if BPGs are excluded.  
      In Hypothesis 2, I use the change in NIBB as managers’ incentive to manipulate earnings and 
report the results of model (2) for full sample in Table 1.7. In both OLS regression and Tobit 
regression, the coefficient on ΔNIBB is negative and significant at 1% level (OLS: -0.1654, 
P<0.01; Tobit: -0.2731, P<0.01) after adding various controls. Thus, larger BPGs are recognized 
when the changes in NIBB are lower, consistent with my earnings management hypothesis. In 
regression (3), the level-3 fair value estimates of FDIC loss share receivable, FDIC_receivable, is 
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significantly positively related to change in net income before the gains and losses, ΔNIBB (OLS: 
0.0127, P<0.05; Tobit: 00455, P<0.01).  
      Table 1.8 reveals the Tobit regression results of model (2) for positive ΔNIBB and negative 
ΔNIBB subsamples. The coefficient on change in NIBB is only significantly negative (-0.5234; 
P<0.01) in negative ΔNIBB subsample, while it becomes marginally positive in positive ΔNIBB 
subsample. The results in Table 8 suggest that acquiring banks with increasing NIBB are not 
strongly motivated to use BPGs to smooth earnings, whereas acquiring banks experience an 
earnings decline before the effect of BPGs likely to report larger BPGs to avoid it. 
    1.6.2 Fair value estimates of FDIC loss share receivable 
      Table 1.9 shows the results of augment model (1) and (2) with a term that control for level-3 
fair value estimates of FDIC loss share receivable acquired in bargain purchase acquisitions and 
its interaction with NIBB and ΔNIBB. If FDIC loss share receivable is intentionally valued for 
smoothing purposes, the coefficient on the interactive term should be negative and significant, 
denoting increased earnings management obtained from acquiring higher proportions of FDIC 
loss share receivable. In the sample of bargain purchase acquisitions, the coefficient on the 
interaction between NIBB and FDIC_receivable is negative and significant (-0.7874, P<0.05), 
but the coefficient on the interaction term between ΔNIBB and FDIC_receivable is positive. 
Regarding the control variables, the coefficient on acquiring banks’ altman z-score in preceding 
year is significantly positive (0.0208, P<0.01), indicating the positive relation between acquiring 
banks’ probability of bankruptcy and amount of BPGs recognized. 
      It is unclear that whether acquiring banks enter the transaction with sole purpose of managing 
their earnings, or the conjectured overstatement happens after the fact. I adopt Heckman (1978) 
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two-stage model to explicitly account for the drivers of acquisitions. Table 1.10 presents the 
results of my estimation of the probit regression described in Equation (3). Consistent with Yim 
(2013), the coefficients on Size (0.1719, P<0.001) and Ret (0.1657, P<0.1) are significantly 
positive, while the coefficients on Tobin_Q, Cash Flow, and NI are insignificant. Table 1.11 
presents the estimates from regression of BPGs on explanatory variables. This specification 
includes the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) from stage-one model. The coefficient on the IMR is 
statistically insignificant (-0.0047; P>0.1). The significant and negative coefficients on NIBB (-
0.1141; P<0.01) and ΔNIBB (-0.1933; P<0.01) still holds, consistent with our hypothesis that 
acquirers are reporting larger BPGs when the earnings performance before BPGs is worse. The 
coefficient on the interaction between NIBB and FDIC_receivable is -0.1101 (P<0.1), but the 
insignificant coefficient on the interaction term between ΔNIBB and FDIC_receivable is not 
consistent with my prediction. 
    1.6.3 Additional analysis 
    1.6.3.1 Future impairment of FDIC loss share receivable  
      Managing earnings by reporting discretionary BPGs is not costless, because the optimistic 
fair value estimates of FDIC loss share receivable increases the possibility of future impairment, 
thus reduces other operating income in the years following acquisitions. If this is the case, I 
expect that acquiring banks in BPG group experience a higher impairment of FDIC loss share 
receivable and a larger drop in other noninterest income in following years. I perform a time-
series analysis of FDIC loss share receivable and other noninterest income, and report the 
Wilcoxon singed ranks z-value for the change in variables between current and the preceding 
year in Table 1.12. 
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      The evidence in Table 1.12 is consistent with my proposition. BPG banks’ FDIC loss share 
receivable drops significantly over three years after acquisition, while GDWL banks keep a 
stable trend over the same period. For BPG banks, the other noninterest income decreases from 
year +1 through year +3. The changes are significant over the first two years. For GDWL banks, 
the same variable increases in year +1 and doesn’t change significantly in subsequent years. By 
performing the time-series analysis, I find that only BPG banks recognize higher impairment of 
FDIC loss share receivable and a larger decrease in other noninterest income in years following 
acquisitions, highlighting the potential cost of their earnings management practices. 
    1.6.3.2 Financial crisis period 
      In order to avoid the potential for the financial crisis to affect my inferences, I exclude 
observations from 2008 through 2009. Untabulated analysis reveals that excluding these 
observations does not affect my inferences. I still find that acquiring banks intentionally write up 
the level-3 fair value estimates of FDIC loss share receivable to smooth earnings through the 
recognition of BPGs. 
1.7 Conclusions 
      In business acquisitions where fair value estimates of net identifiable assets acquired exceeds 
purchase price, the excess amount is reported as BPG, a day one gain in income statement under 
revised FASB ASC 805. In this chapter, the question I address is the extent to which and how 
acquiring banks use BPGs to manage earnings. 
      My sample consists of 204 bargain purchase acquisitions and 204 goodwill acquisitions in 
the banking industry from 2008 through 2012. I test earnings management through recognition of 
BPGs by estimating the relation between BPGs and earnings performance before the effect of 
26 
 
BPGs. My results show that reported BPGs are larger when net income before BPGs are low or 
below prior year’s level, suggesting that the revised accounting stander opens door to acquiring 
firms to manage earnings by reporting bargain purchase gains as ordinary income. I also find that 
the relations are significantly more negative for acquiring banks with higher level-3 fair value 
estimates of FDIC loss share receivable. This finding point out that acquiring banks 
opportunistically use the discretion afforded by fair value accounting. All the results still hold 
after I use Heckman two-stage model. 
      In additional test, I provide evidence that acquiring banks involved with bargain purchase 
acquisitions recognize a higher impairment to FDIC loss share receivable and a larger decrease 
in other noninterest income in following years, figuring out the potential cost of earnings 
management through over-optimism in fair valuation.  
      My research raises questions about the appropriateness of the accounting for bargain 
purchase acquisition required by ASC 805. The changes introduced by ASC 805 may provide a 
new opportunity for acquiring banks to influence earnings number. In addition, questionable 
judgments used in fair value estimation, especially in level-3 fair value estimation, are likely to 
remain. Given the context of bargain purchase acquisitions performed by banks, I recommend 
that fair value estimates be evaluated by qualified, independent party, and disclosure improved 







Table 1.1  
Panel A: Sample Selection 
   Bargain purchase acquisitions completed between 2008 and 2012 
 
412 
Excluding non-financial industries 
 
208 
Excluding missing COMPUSTAT and CRSP data 
 
15 
Excluding missing acquisition data from 10-K filing 
 
19 
Final sample   170 
   Panel B: A Breakdown of the Number of Bank Bargain Purchase Acquisitions within One Firm-year 
For BPG banks: 
  Number of acquisitions within one firm-year 
 













Total   159 
BPG banks represent banks take at least one bargain purchase acquisition within one firm-year. 
These 159 acquirers account for 204 bargain purchase acquisitions completed between 2008 and 2012. 













Distribution of BPG Acquisitions in the Banking Industry 
Panel A: By calendar year 
    2008   2009   2010 
 
2011   2012 
  
  
    
    

































Percent   0.00%   23.27%   30.19%   25.79%   20.75% 
Panel B: By quarter 
 
  1st 
 
2nd   3rd   4th   Total  
# of BPG acquisitions 
 






















Descriptive Statistics in the Banking Industry 
Panel A: BPG Acquisitions (BPG=1) 
















































































































































Payment 174   0.4138***   0.0000   0.4939   0.0000   1.0000 
            Panel B: GDWL Acquisitions (BPG=0) 






















































































































































Payment 162   0.7716   1.0000   0.4211   1.0000   1.0000 
  
***, **, and * indicate the difference between the BPG banks and GDWL banks is significant at p<0.001, p<0.05  
and p<0.1, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
Variable Definitions: 
BPGain = bargain purchase gain deflated by prior year total assets; 
NIBB = net income before taxes and bargain purchase gain, deflated by prior year total assets; 
ΔNIBB = the change in net income before taxes and bargain purchase gain, deflated by prior year total assets; 
NI= acquirer's net income before taxes, deflated by prior year total assets; 
Loss =1 if the acquirer's ROA before bargain purchase gain is negative, and 0 otherwise; 
    
Decline = 1 if the acquirer's ROA before bargain purchase gain is lower than prior year's ROA, and 0 
otherwise   
FDIC = 1 if the acquisition is assisted by FDIC, = 0 otherwise; 
FDIC_receivable = the level-3 fair value estimate of FDIC receivables acquired over the total assets acquired; 
Size = the natural logarithm of the acquirer's prior year total assets; 
Altman= Acquirer's altman z-score in the year preceding the acquisition. 
 
Target_size= the natural logarithm of the target's prior year total assets; 
      
Target_ni = target's ROA in the year preceding the acquisition; 
Relsize = the ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size in the year preceding the acquisition; 











Time-series Analysis of Earnings Variables for BPG Group versus GDWL Group  
  
Relative years to acquisition (year 0) 
  
-3 -2 -1 0a 0b 1 
Variable Sample Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median Mean  Median 
EPS BPG firms 0.9046 0.7800 0.8364 0.6300 0.5889 0.5000 
-
0.3585 0.2677 1.0608 0.7650 0.8317 0.7600 
 
z-value 
























              
 
GDWL 
firms  1.0403 0.9900 0.5243 0.8500 1.0966 0.8400 
  
1.1233 1.1700 0.9739 1.1000 
 
z-value 








  n   80 
 
143   164 
  






    
  
      
  
    
ROE BPG firms 0.0941 0.1032 0.1219 0.1064 0.1764 0.1126 
-
0.0255 0.0998 0.1477 0.1435 0.2540 0.1584 
 
z-value 
























              
 
GDWL 
firms  0.1381 0.1266 0.1431 0.1302 0.1602 0.1592 
  
0.1674 0.1621 0.2017 0.1882 
 
z-value 








  n   80   143   164       132   101 
              a The year of acquisition when bargain purchase gain is excluded. 
b The year of acquisition when bargain purchase gain is included. 
EPS = primary earnings per share excluding extraordinary items. 
ROE = income before taxes, deflated by prior year's equity. 
z-value represents Wilcoxon signed ranks z-value for the change in the earnings variable between the current and the preceding year. 













                                                          





































Event Year Relative to the BPG Year ("0")
25th percentile of NI
25th percentile of NIBB
50th percentile of NI
50th percentile of NIBB
75th percentile of NI








Regressions Examining the Relation between Bargain Purchase Gains and Earnings Levels 
  
Model: BPGaini,t=αi,t+β1 NIBBi,t+βi Controls +εi,t 
  


















































































































































































   
0.0011 
  
   
0.0087*** 
  
    
(0.80) 
  
   
(3.80) 
  FDIC_receivable 
   
  
0.0033 




    
  
(0.56) 


































Adjusted R2 (LR Chi2)   0.0912   0.2174   0.2166   29.01   134.33   125.04 








Regressions Examining the Relation Between Bargain Purchase Gains and Earnings Levels 
  



























































































































































   
0.0066*** 
  
   
0.0083 
  
    
(4.38) 
  
   
(1.51) 
  FDIC_receivable 
   
  
0.0116** 




    
  
(2.24) 


































LR Chi2   1.11   85.29   63.59   2.93   54.12   52.29 















                                                          
4 To be consistent with Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2, the deflator of NI and NIBB in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 is 




































Event Year Relative to the BPG Year ("0")
25th percentile of ΔNI 
25th percentile of ΔNIBB
50th percentile of ΔNI
50th percentile of ΔNIBB
75th percentile of ΔNI








Regressions Examining the Relation Between Bargain Purchase Gains and Earnings Changes 
  



























































































































































   
0.0030** 
  
   
0.0147*** 
  
    
(2.33) 
  
   
(5.65) 
  FDIC_receivable 
   
  
0.0127** 




    
  
(2.17) 


































Adjusted R2 (LR Chi2)   0.0007   0.195   0.1814   1.26   97.31   76.73 









Regressions Examining the Relation Between Bargain Purchase Gains and Earnings Changes 
  
Tobit Model: BPGaini,t=αi,t+β1 ΔNIBBi,t+βi Controls +εi,t 


























































































































































   
0.0127*** 
  
   
0.0068* 
  
    
(4.53) 
  
   
(1.69) 
  FDIC_receivable 
   
  
0.0357*** 




    
  
(3.81) 


































LR Chi2   18.56   72.43   60.37   52.63   44.64   37.45 





Earnings Management as a Function of Fair Value Estimates of FDIC Receivable: 
BPG Subsample 
Tobit Model: BPGaini,t=αi,t+β1 NIBBi,t+β2ΔNIBBi,t+ β3 FDIC_receivablei,t+ 
β4 NIBBi,t*FDIC_receivablei,t+β5ΔNIBBi,t*FDIC_receivablei,t +βi Controls +εi,t 























































































   
-0.0004 
    
(-0.44) 
Relsize 
   
-0.0022 
    
(-1.28) 
Payment 
   
0.0004 







LR Chi2      119.72 








Probit Regression of the Choice to Take Acquisitions 
Model: Probit(Acqi,t)= α+β1 Sizei,t-1+β2 Tobin_Qi,t-1 +β3 Cash Flowi,t-1+β4 Reti,t-1+ β5 NIi,t-1 +εi,t 

















































       Number of observations 
     
2414 
Wald chi2 (9) 
     
125.13 







  Regression of Bargain Purchase Gain 
  Model: BPGaini,t=αi,t+β1 NIBBi,t+β2ΔNIBBi,t+ β3 FDIC_receivablei,t+β4 NIBBi,t*FDIC_receivablei,t+  
β5ΔNIBBi, t*FDIC_receivablei,t +β6 IMR+βi Controls +εi,t 
  



































































































         Number of observations 
     
188 
  ***, **, and * indicate significance at p<0.001, p<0.05 and p<0.1, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 








Time-series Analysis of FDIC Loss Share Receivable and Other Noninterest Income for BPG Firms 
  
          
  
-1 0 1 2 3 
Variable Sample Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median Mean Median 
FDIC_receivable BPG firms 0.0287 0 0.0512 0.0359 0.0318 0.0218 0.0193      0.0094  0.0104 
























            
 
GDWL 
firms 0.0121 0 0.0332 0.0213 0.0225 0.0142 0.0179 0.0098 0.0088 0.0029 
 
z-value 




















            Other_noninterest BPG firms 0.0228 0.0146 0.0301 0.0213 0.016 0.0126 0.0105 0.0092 0.0089 0.0064 
 
z-value 




















            
 
GDWL 
firms 0.0126 0.0102 0.0091 0.0057 0.0088 0.0066 0.0054 0.0027 0.0028 0.0012 
 
z-value 












12   12   12   10 
FDIC_receivable = Acquirer’s FDIC receivable deflated by prior year's total assets. 
Other_noninterest= Acquirer’s other noninterest income deflated by prior year's total assets. 















A Bargain Purchase Acquisition Example in the Banking Industry 
The business combination disclosure in the 10-K of First Bancorp on December 31, 2009: 
The statement of net assets acquired as of June 19, 2009 and the resulting gain (as adjusted) are presented in the following table. 







Recorded by Value Recorded by 








Cash and cash equivalents   $ 66,096     –     66,096 
Securities     40,189     –     40,189 
Presold mortgages     3,249     –     3,249 
Loans     828,958     (227,854) (a)   601,104 
Core deposit intangible     −     3,798 (b)   3,798 
FDIC loss share receivable     −     185,112 (c)   185,112 
Foreclosed properties     15,993     (3,534) (d)   12,459 
Other assets     4,178     (137) (e)   4,041 
Total     958,663     (42,615) 
 
  916,048 
                    
Liabilities                   
Deposits   $ 706,139     5,922 (f)   712,061 
Borrowings     153,056     6,409 (g)   159,465 
Other     2,227     160 (e)   2,387 






                    
Excess of assets received over 
liabilities     97,241     (55,106 )   42,135 
Less:  Asset discount     (123,000 )           
Cash received from FDIC at closing     25,759           25,759 
                    
Total gain recorded               $ 67,894 
 
Explanation of Fair Value Adjustments 
  (a) This estimated fair value adjustment is necessary as of the acquisition date to write down Cooperative Bank’s book value of loans to the 
estimated fair value as a result of future expected loan losses. 
 
  (b) This estimated fair value adjustment represents the value of the core deposit base assumed in the acquisition based on a study performed by 
an independent consulting firm.  This amount was recorded by the Company as an identifiable intangible asset and will be amortized as an 
expense on a straight-line basis over the average life of the core deposit base, which is estimated to be 8 years. 
 
  (c) This estimated fair value adjustment represents the amount that the Company will receive from the FDIC under its loss share agreements as a 
result of future loan losses. 
 
  (d) This estimated fair value adjustment is necessary to write down Cooperative Bank’s book value of foreclosed real estate properties to their 
estimated fair value as of the acquisition date. 
 
  (e) These estimated fair value adjustments are other immaterial adjustments made to acquired assets and assumed liabilities to reflect fair value. 
 
  (f) This estimated fair value adjustment was recorded because the weighted average interest rate of Cooperative Bank’s time deposits exceeded 
the cost of similar wholesale funding at the time of the acquisition.  This amount will be amortized to reduce interest expense on a declining 
basis over the average life of the portfolio of approximately 15 months. 
 
  (g) This estimated fair value adjustment was recorded because the interest rates of Cooperative Bank’s fixed rate borrowings exceeded current 
interest rates on similar borrowings.  This amount was realized shortly after the acquisition by prepaying the borrowings at a premium, and 













BPGain   Bargain purchase gain deflated by prior year total assets. 
NIBB 
 
Net income before taxes and bargain purchase gain, deflated by prior year total assets. 
ΔNIBB 
 
The change in net income before taxes and bargain purchase gain, deflated by prior year total assets. 
NI 
 
Acquirer's net income before taxes, deflated by prior year total assets. 
Loss 
 
Equal to 1 if the acquirer's ROA before bargain purchase gain is negative and 0 otherwise. 
Decline 
 
Equal to 1 if the acquirer's ROA before bargain purchase gain is lower than prior year's ROA and 0 otherwise. 
FDIC 
 
Equal to 1 if the acquisition is assisted by FDIC, = 0 otherwise. 
FDIC_receivable 
 
The level-3 fair value estimate of FDIC receivables acquired over the total assets acquired. 
Other_noninterest  Acquirer’s other noninterest income deflated by prior year's total assets. 
Size 
 
The natural logarithm of the acquirer's prior year total assets. 
Altman 
 
Acquirer's Altman z-score in the year preceding the acquisition. 
Target_size 
 
The natural logarithm of the target's prior year total assets. 
Target_ni 
 
Target's ROA in the year preceding the acquisition. 
Relsize 
 
The ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size in the year preceding the acquisition. 
Payment 
 
Equal to 1 if paid by cash and 0 otherwise. 
Acq 
 
Equal to 1 if the acquiring firm announce an acquisition and 0 otherwise. 
Tobin_Q 
 
The market value of asset over book value of acquiring firm’s assets. 
Cash flow 
 
Acquiring firm’s earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by market capitalization. 
Ret 
 









Fair Value Accounting, Earnings Management, and the Case of 
Bargain Purchase Gain 
2.1 Introduction  
      Under previous accounting guidance, in business acquisitions where the fair value of net 
assets acquired exceeds the purchase consideration paid, acquiring firms recognize the excess 
amount as negative goodwill. Negative goodwill is first used to set off the fair value assigned to 
certain non-monetary assets acquired that are typically hard to value, such as property, plant, 
equipment, and intangibles. After the fair value of those hard-to-value assets is reduced to zero, 
any remaining amount of negative goodwill would be recognized in the acquirer’s income 
statement as an extraordinary gain.5  In December 2007, the FASB issued Accounting Standards 
Codification™ (ASC) 805, Business Combinations (formerly FASB Statement 141, 
Business Combinations). Under the new accounting standard, the entire amount of negative 
goodwill is no longer used to reduce the fair value of certain assets acquired, but is reported as a 
bargain purchase gain (“BPG”), which is a component of income from continuing operations. 
ASC 805 became effective for acquisitions completed during annual reporting periods that begin 
on or after December 15, 2008. Presumably, there are few instances where a business is sold for 
amounts below the fair value of the net assets being sold. However, the fair value estimates of 
net assets at date of acquisition give the acquiring management considerable flexibility in 
judgments surrounding the fair values assigned to those assets. 
                                                          




      In my preliminary analysis, I find that bargain purchase transactions are not so rare, which 
leads to a questions of whether management utilizes BPGs to manage earnings, and if so, what is 
the mechanics for achieving such gains. Prior literature studies how firms use their accounting 
choice to manage earnings. Hand (1989) suggests that firms use the accounting-based reported 
earnings gain from debt-equity swaps to offset an unexpected and transitory decrease in earnings. 
Haw, Jung and Lilien (1991) shows that firms use pension gains from curtailment of defined 
pension plans to similarly smooth a decline reported earnings. The curtailments are accounting 
transactions without cash consequences. More recent studies look at how the flexibility in fair 
value accounting allows for earning management. For example, fair value gains in available-for-
sale assets (Barth et al. 2012) and gains from asset securitization (Dechow et al. 2010) have been 
found to be used to avoid earnings decreases or negative earnings.  
      Shalev et al. (2013) investigates how managers exercise their discretions in goodwill 
acquisitions, where the consideration paid exceeds the fair value of net assets acquired. Shalev et 
al. (2013) suggests that earnings management in goodwill acquisitions is achieved through 
discretionary fair value estimate assigned to goodwill and intangible assets. Since goodwill is 
unamortized and the likelihood of goodwill impairment is remote, acquiring management engage 
in such transactions to benefit from increased compensation. My research focuses on earnings 
manipulation in bargain purchase acquisitions. I identify a unique event where managers are able 
to achieve day one earnings by writing up intangible assets, and I investigate whether fair value 
estimates of intangible assets and the recognition of BPGs are potential earnings management 
tools.  
      EDGAR Online I-Metrix is used to identify Form 10-K filings containing business 




assets acquired, liabilities assumed, and other necessary financial data. Bank acquisitions account 
for 43.63%6 of bargain purchase acquisitions. Since most acquisitions of banks are directed by 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and there are other factors in particular driving 
the recognition of BPGs in the banking industry7, this study focuses on other industries, which 
comprises 56.37% of bargain purchase acquisitions. The final sample consists of 167 non-
financial bargain purchase acquisitions of 136 firm year observations. For a comparison with 
firms that recognize goodwill in acquisitions, I employ a pair-match control group of 167 non-
financial goodwill acquisitions. 
      First, I investigate whether acquiring managers exercise their discretion obtained from ASC 
805 to manipulate the amount of BPGs. The manipulation is nonrecurring and is not costless, 
because the optimistic fair value estimates of intangibles increases the possibility of future 
impairment, thus reduces earnings in the years following acquisitions. Acquiring managers are 
motivated to report larger BPGs when the expected benefits are higher. Following Dechow et al. 
(2010), I assume that acquiring managers’ incentives to manipulate BPGs are relatively strong 
when the earnings before BPGs are low or below prior year’s level. Consistent with my 
prediction, my empirical results show that BPGs are negatively related to earnings before BPGs 
and changes in earnings before BPGs.  
      Next, I examine how acquiring managers can influence the amount of BPGs. Past literature 
shows that ambiguity exists over the implementation of fair value accounting, especially over 
level-3 fair valuation of intangibles, which is highly depended on managers’ estimates (Shalev, 
2013). I test the association between the level-3 fair value of intangible assets recorded by 
                                                          
6 43.63% of bargain purchase acquisitions in my sample are depository institutions (SIC Code 60). The industry 
frequency is shown in Table 2.2. 
7 The driving factor of BPG in banking industry is discussed in the first chapter of my dissertation, “Bank earnings 




acquiring company in bargain purchase acquisitions and the intensity of earnings management 
practices. The positive relationship suggests that acquiring firms consciously estimate level-3 fair 
value of intangible assets acquired to intensify the earnings management activity. 
      I am trying to address econometric issues in this chapter. It is probable that firms self-select 
to perform bargain purchase acquisitions based on firm characteristics, or other unobservable 
factors. The standard OLS regression is likely to result in biased coefficients. I adopt Heckman 
(1978) two-stage model to address potential bias in the standard OLS regressions due to self-
selection. Using the Heckman two-stage model, I investigate the factors that driving the 
occurrence of bargain purchase acquisitions and reject a null hypothesis that acquiring firms are 
randomly choosing to perform bargain purchase acquisitions or goodwill acquisitions. The 
results of earnings management through reporting BPGs still hold after controlling for sample 
selection. 
      As an additional analysis, I perform a time-series analysis of amortization expense and 
impairment of intangible assets for BPG group and the control group. If BPG firms intentionally 
overestimate the fair value of intangible assets acquired, they will experience an increase in 
amortization expense or a higher probability of impairment for intangibles in future years. The 
analysis confirms the increasing pattern of amortization and impairment for BPG firms and the 
stable trend for goodwill firms, suggesting that BPG firms suffer the cost of earnings 
management practices in the years following bargain purchase acquisitions. 
      To test how investors perceive bargain purchase acquisitions and goodwill acquisitions and 
price them, I measure their future performance by abnormal stock returns. I find that the 




acquisition completion announcement date. At the same time, long-horizon event study shows 
that bargain purchase acquisitions outperform while goodwill acquisitions underperform 
significantly in the 250 days after the acquisitions. The results suggest that investors consider the 
overpayment in goodwill acquisition as bad news, while the bargain purchase acquisition does 
not signal bad news. The market tends to differentiate bargain purchase acquisitions and 
goodwill acquisitions and price them accordingly in long run.  
      This chapter contributes to two streams of literature. First, it adds to the literature on earnings 
management (Hand 1989, Dechow et al. 2010, Barth et al. 2012, Shalev 2013). I use a unique 
setting, where revised accounting standards allows for recognition of a day one gain, to suggest 
that acquiring firms are using BPGs to influence earnings. Second, this study adds to literature 
on fair value accounting (Martin et al. 2006, Ronen, 2008, Kolev 2009) by suggesting that 
acquiring managers intentionally estimate level-3 fair value of intangible assets acquired in order 
to immediately recognize BPG. There is a concurrent study which are most related to this paper. 
Dunn, Kohlbeck, and Smith (2015) examines the earnings management in FDIC-assisted bank 
acquisitions and the market reactions to BPGs. However, Dunn, Kohlbeck, and Smith (2015) 
focuses exclusively on bank acquisitions, while my sample covers a broad range of industries 
and extends the sample years from 2008 to 2012. I also differentiate my research by discussing 
the drivers of bargain purchase acquisitions and the important role of fair value estimates for 
achieving BPGs in non-financial acquisitions. 
      This paper calls for the users of financial statements to pay attention to firms involved with 
bargain purchase acquisitions because they may have incentives and ability to manipulate 




      The remainder of this paper is as follows. Next section provides a background for bargain 
purchase acquisitions. Section 2.3 reviews the previous literature and develops testable 
hypotheses. Section 2.4 describes research design, and Section 2.5 shows the sample selection 
and data description. In Section 2.6, I show the empirical results. Section 2.7 discusses the 
conclusions and implications of my findings.    
2.2 Background 
      In a typical bargain purchase acquisition, the purchase price is allocated to assets and 
liabilities based on their estimated fair values on the acquisition date. The acquiring management 
could determine fair values with assistance from outside consultants and use fair value 
methodologies in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. The excess of fair 
value of the net assets acquired over the purchase price was recorded as a bargain purchase gain 
and is shown as a separate component of earnings in the acquiring firm’s income statement. 
      The FASB issued SFAS No. 157 Fair Value Measurements in September 2006, which 
“defines fair value, establishes a framework for measuring fair value, and expands disclosures 
about fair value measurements” (SFAS 157, P.8 paragraph 1). The framework uses 3-level fair 
value hierarchy to reflect the level of judgment involved in estimating fair values:  
    “Level 1 inputs are quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets or 
liabilities that the reporting entity has the ability to access at the measurement date... Level 2 
inputs are inputs other than quoted prices included within Level 1 that are observable for the 
asset or liability, either directly or indirectly… Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs for the 




the assumptions that market participants would use in pricing the asset or liability (including 
assumptions about risk).” (SFAS 157, P.12 paragraph 3, 7; P.15 paragraph 2) 
      This standard gives the highest priority to Level-1 fair value and the lowest priority to Level-
3, but does not provide implementation guidance on how to incorporate management judgments 
in arriving at fair values. Given this, acquiring firms have subjectivity in fair value accounting 
and the recognition of BPGs.  
      To better understand bargain purchase acquisitions, Appendix 2.1 presents an example of 
business combination disclosure (Note 4: Business combination to Consolidated Financial 
Statements) in the Form 10-K of Plures Technologies Incorporated (“PTI”) on December 31, 
2011. On May 23, 2011, PTI, a business development company, acquired Advanced 
MicroSensors Corporation by issuing common stock. PTI discloses that “the company’s 
management determined fair value with assistance from its outside consultants and used fair 
value methodologies in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles to arrive at the 
fair value of both tangible and intangible assets. The fair values of the assets of AMS Inc. were 
significantly higher than the purchase price, which was the primary factors resulting in the 
recording of a gain on the purchase” (10-K, Page F-12 Paragraph 4). Specifically, “the valuation 
of the intangible assets was based on methodologies that relied upon forward looking forecasts 
that considered all known information at that time, the most significant assumption being the 
revenue growth of the company, primarily in the magnetic sensor business” (10-K, Page F-12 
Paragraph 6). PTI reports $4,785,977 in assets acquired at fair value, including $1,881,000 in 
intangible assets, and $2,693,651 in liabilities assumed at fair value. The application of 
acquisition accounting results in a bargain purchase gain of $1,652,523, which is included in the 




      This example shows that the magnitude of BPG can have a significant impact on PTI’s 
financial statement. BPG takes 179.77% of PTI’s total assets in preceding year. At the same time, 
the fair value of intangible assets acquired has been put in the spotlight as it frequently makes up 
a large portion of the purchase price (89.90%) in bargain purchase acquisition and can largely 
contribute to the source of BPG (113.83%). 
 
2.3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
      This study follows two streams of literature: (1) literature on earnings management; (2) 
literature on fair value accounting. 
    2.3.1 Earnings Management 
      The literature on earnings management is quite extensive about firm managers’ motivations 
to use their reporting discretion to influence earnings data. First, earnings management is a 
method for firms to signal the good quality of their business to financial statements users 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997, Ahmed et al., 1999). Second, as earnings play an important role 
in managers’ compensation (Healy and Wahlen, 1999), managers’ are motivated to misrepresent 
earnings data. Furthermore, incentives for managerial intervention in earnings include risk 
aversion, debt covenants, and tax goals (Moyer 1990, Scholes et al. 1990, Collins et al. 1995, 
Beatty et al. 1995, Dechow et al. 2010). 
      Prior studies have provided evidence of real-activities earnings management (Roychowdhury 
2006; Graham et al. 2005) and accrual-based earnings management. Examples for accrual-based 
earnings management include bad debt expense (Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998), loan loss 




Petroni 2002). However, limited research investigates the accounting discretion exercised by 
acquiring management in business combinations. In this chapter, I am trying to fill in the gap by 
examining whether managers use the recognition of BPGs to intentionally dampen the 
fluctuations of firms’ earnings. The manipulation of BPGs is not costless: managers need to 
overestimate fair value of net assets acquired to recognize a larger amount of BPGs, thus 
increase the probability of recording future impairment. Managers will time the recognition of 
BPGs to periods in which the benefits are larger. Previous research documents systematic 
evidence of incentives to avoid reporting negative earnings and earnings decreases (Barth et al., 
1995, Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997, Dechow et al. 2010). Following Dechow et al. (2010), I 
focus on two circumstances in which the expected benefits of BPGs are relatively large. In the 
first circumstance, managers’ incentives to report BPGs are stronger when the pre-managed 
earnings are lower. Under this circumstance, managers face the pressure from management 
compensation, debt covenants, risk aversion, and signaling to investors. The expected benefits of 
reporting larger earnings number are higher than the potential costs. In the second circumstance, 
managers have strong incentives to avoid earnings decreases (Barth et al., 1999), thus they likely 
to time the BPGs to periods in which earnings before BPGs are lower than prior year’s level. 
      H1: There is a negative correlation between BPGs and earnings before the effect of 
BPGs. 
      H2: There is a negative correlation between BPGs and changes in earnings before the 
effect of BPGs. 




      In this chapter, I investigate how managers use their discretion in fair value accounting to 
influence the amount of BPGs.  
      FASB ASC 805 requires all assets and liabilities, tangibles and intangibles, acquired in a 
business combination to be recognized at their fair values. Any excess of the purchase price over 
amounts allocated to acquired net assets is recorded as goodwill. Where amounts allocated to 
assets acquired and liabilities assumed is greater than the purchase price, a bargain purchase gain 
is recognized.  
      This accounting guidance for business combination has put intangible assets firmly in the 
spotlight because of the growing significance of intangible assets as a portion of the assets 
acquired. The valuation of intangible assets can have a significant impact on earnings through 
the record of BPG and the impairment over their remaining useful lives. Acquirers must go 
through a robust process of identifying and valuing intangible assets. The key steps include 
identification of intangible assets, estimation of discount rate, selection of valuation 
methodology, valuation analysis, and reconciliation of results8. This process is largely based on 
management’s significant judgments and best estimates for projected cash flows, discount rates, 
royalty rates, and remaining useful life, which are considered level-3 unobservable inputs and 
can differ materially from actual results. 
     Prior studies view the use of managerial subjectivity in preparing financial statements as a 
vehicle to communicate managers’ private information regarding future earnings to investors 
(Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002; Ronen and Sadan 1981; Sankar and Subramanyam 2001; 
Demski 1998; Beaver and Venkatachalam 2003; Beatty and Harris 1999). Other literature argues 
                                                          




that agency conflicts could impair the informativeness of managerial judgments in financial 
reporting (Demski 1998; Tucker and Zarowin 2006). Management could overstate firm’s 
performance to meet their bonus target or to protect their job (Healy 1985; Fudenberg and Tirole 
1995; Arya et al. 1998). If an acquisition is motivated by acquirer management’s self- interest 
(Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993), they have an incentive to overvalue the future benefits 
associated with it. In these circumstances, managerial judgment makes the financial reporting 
less informative about a firm’s future economic performance. 
      The expanding use of fair value estimates has brought attention to the relevance and 
reliability of those metrics. Barth et al (1996) and Carroll et al (2003) have documented 
empirically that fair value estimates are generally value-relevant over and above historical cost 
figures. Findings also imply that the reliability of fair value disclosure is questionable, as 
managers have incentives and opportunity to bias the reported values, (Barth 1994; Barth et al. 
1996; Danbolt and Rees 2008). When the reliance on managerial judgment and estimates in the 
determination of fair value opens a door to intentional bias, mark-to-model (levels 2 and 3) fair 
value are considered less reliable than mark-to-market (Level 1) fair value (Martin et al. 2006; 
Ronen 2008; Kolev 2009). In business combinations, researchers have raised specific concerns 
that the amount allocated to intangible assets is likely to favor earnings management behaviors. 
Shalev et al. (2013) find that firms could optimize the value of intangible assets in order to 
minimize the impact of their amortizations on subsequent income. 
      The above discussion suggests that intangible assets in bargain purchase acquisitions are 
potential earnings management tools. This possibility has been figured out (Lilien et al. 2012), 
but little empirical evidence has been provided about how level-3 fair value of intangible assets 




level-3 fair value of intangible assets acquired should be related to the intensity of earnings 
management. 
      H3: There is a positive correlation between level-3 fair value of intangible assets 
acquired and the intensity of earnings management practices. 
2.4 Research Design 
      In this section, I discuss the research methodology and variable construction. The first 
hypothesis predicts that acquiring managers are motivated to report larger BPGs when pre-
managed earnings are low or below prior year’s level. The recognition of BPGs is costly, 
because the optimistic estimation in acquisitions results in an increase in amortization and 
impairment in future years. I assume that acquiring managers’ incentives are relatively weak 
when earnings before BPGs are high or exceed prior year earnings, and relatively strong when 
earnings before BPGs are low or fall short of prior year earnings. 
      In H1, I predict that there is a negative relationship between BPGs and earnings before BPGs. 
Following Dechow et al. (2010) and Barth et al. (2012), I employ the following OLS model to 
test this estimation:   
BPGaini,t=αi,t + β1 NIBBi,t + Controls + εi,t                                                                   (1) 
        Where εi,t is an error term, and: 
- BPGaini,t = bargain purchase gains realized in acquisition i in period t, deflated by prior 
year assets. 
- NIBBi,t = net income before taxes and bargain purchase gains in period t, scaled by 




      Prior studies provide limited guidance for the determinants of BPG. Following literature on 
price premium paid in business combination (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), I include the 
characteristics of acquiring firm, target, and acquisition data as controls.  
- Acquirer_z-scorei,t-1= Acquirer's altman z-score in the year preceding the acquisition. 
- Target_roai,t-1 = Target's ROA in the year preceding the acquisition.  
- Relsizei,t-1 = the ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size in the year 
preceding the acquisition. 
- Paymenti,t= 1 if paid by cash, =2 if paid by the combination of cash and stock, =3 if paid 
by stock. 
      Similarly, H2 predicts a negative relation between the amount of BPGs and the change in net 
income before BPGs. Following Dechow et al. (2010) and Barth et al. (2012), I use the following 
OLS regression model.    
BPGaini,t=αi,t + β1 ΔNIBBi,t + Controls + εi,t                                                      (2) 
      Where εi,t is an error term, and: 
- BPGaini,t = bargain purchase gains realized in acquisition i in period t, deflated by prior 
year assets. 
- ΔNIBBi,t = the change in net income before taxes and bargain purchase gains in period t, 
scaled by average total assets. 
- Acquirer_z-scorei,t-1= Acquirer's altman z-score in the year preceding the acquisition. 
- Target_roai,t-1 = Target's ROA in the year preceding the acquisition.  
- Relsizei,t-1 = the ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size in the year 




- Paymenti,t = 1 if paid by cash, =2 if paid by the combination of cash and stock, =3 if paid 
by stock. 
      In H3, I hypothesize that acquiring managers in bargain purchase acquisitions use their 
discretion over level-3 fair value estimates of intangible assets to manage earnings. This results 
in a positive relationship between level-3 fair value of intangible assets acquired and the intensity 
of earnings management.  
      Following Barth et al. (2012), I add a control for the proportion of intangible assets acquired 
in business combination, Intangible, and its interaction with NIBB and ΔNIBB to the equation (1) 
and (2): 
BPGaini,t=αi,t + β1 NIBBi,t + β2 Intangiblei,t + β3 NIBBi,t*Intangiblei,t + Controls + εi,t       (3)                                                          
BPGaini,t=αi,t + β1 ΔNIBBi,t + β2 Intangiblei,t + β3 ΔNIBBi,t*Intangiblei,t + Controls + εi,t       (4)      
      Where εi,t is an error term, and:                                                  
- Intangiblei,t = level-3 fair value of intangible assets acquired, deflated by fair value of 
total assets acquired. 
      If intangible assets acquired are valued for earnings management purposes, the coefficient on 
the interaction term should be negative and significant; denoting increased earnings management 
practices resulting from measuring larger proportions of intangible assets in bargain purchase 
acquisitions.  
      Because the choice to take bargain purchase acquisition is voluntary, it is possible that 
manager knows the firm’s earnings performance is relatively strong, and thus is less likely to 




performing bargain purchase acquisitions. Thus, I use a Heckman (1979) two-stage model to 
control for the endogeneity issue. In the first stage, I estimate the following probit regression of 
the choice to take bargain purchase acquisitions: 
    Probit(Choicei,t)= α+β1 Acquirer_sizei,t-1+β2 Acquiree_sizei,t-1+β3 Lossi,t+β4 Declinei,t 
                            
+β5 Number_acqi,t+β6 Q4i,t +β7 Paymenti,t + β8 Intangiblei,t +εi,t                                (5) 
 
    Where εi,t is an error term, and: 
- Acquirer_size = the natural logarithm of acquiring firm’s total assets. 
- Acquiree_size = the natural logarithm of acquiring target’s total assets. 
- Loss = 1 if the acquirer’s net income before BPG is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
- Decline = 1 if the acquirer’s ROA before BPG is lower than prior year’s ROA, and 0 otherwise. 
- Number_acq = the natural logarithm of the number of acquisitions performed by the acquirer. 
- Q4 = 1 if the acquisition occurred in the 4th quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
- Paymenti,t = 1 if paid by cash, =2 if paid by the combination of cash and stock, =3 if paid by stock. 
- Intangiblei,t = level-3 fair value of intangible assets acquired, deflated by fair value of total assets  
acquired. 
      Limited guidance has been provided for the factors that driving the occurrence of bargain 
purchase acquisitions, so I develop the model based on characteristics of acquirer, acquiree, and 
transaction. Large firms have more availability in performing an acquisition but are subject to 
more scrutiny, so the prediction of the coefficient on Acquirer_size is ambiguous. I also include 
the number of acquisitions performed by acquiring firms in transaction year (Number_acq) as a 
control variable. It is probable that the acquiring firms are taking multiple acquisitions within 




exclude this alternative explanation, I expect the coefficient on Number_acq to be significantly 
negative if the acquirer is intentionally engaging in single bargain purchase acquisition to 
manage earnings. Following previous literature stating that firms have stronger incentive to 
manage earnings in fourth quarter, I include a dummy variable equals to one if the acquisition is 
taken in the last quarter (Q4). Most importantly, I include the indicator variable of acquirer’s 
current earnings performance excluding the impact of BPG (Loss and Decline). If the bargain 
purchase acquisition is motivated by the pressure to offset a loss or earnings decline, the 
coefficients on these variables are expected to be positive. In addition, I include the logarithm of 
acquiree’s total assets to control for acquiree’s size, and the payment method to control for its 
potential impact on price premium paid.    
       In the second stage, I estimate the following equation, and include the inverse Mill’s ratio 
(IMR) calculated based on estimation results from Equation (5): 
BPGaini,t= α+β1 NIBBi,t +β2 Intangiblei,t +β3 Interactioni,t + β4 Relsizei,t-1 
+ β5 Altmani,t-1 + β6 Paymenti,t + β7 IMRi,t + εi,t                       (6) 
      Where εi,t is an error term. 
      Previous literature (Larcker and Rusticus, 2008) emphasizes that, in order to successfully 
control for endogeneity, at least one independent variable needs to be identified that is correlated 
with the dependent variable in the first-stage model, but is not associated with the dependent 
variable in the second stage. In my paper, I include Number_acq in the first stage and exclude it 
in the second stage. This variable is expected to be negatively associated with the probability of 




2.5 Data Description 
     The revised FASB ASC 805 became effective for acquisitions completed during annual 
reporting periods that begin on or after December 15, 2008 and requires detailed disclosures. The 
sample consists of acquisitions made by firms excluding financial institutions (two-digit SIC 
codes 60-69 were excluded) and completed between December 15, 2008 and December 31, 2012. 
I use a keyword search for the words “bargain purchase” or “gain from acquisition” to identify 
bargain purchase acquisitions through I-Metrix by Edgar Online. I read each Form 10-k and 
hand-collect acquisition data including announcement date of acquisition completion, amount of 
BPG, fair value estimates of net assets acquired, and purchase consideration transferred. 
Additional financial data of acquiring firms and targets are obtained from COMPUSTAT or 
PrivCo9. The final sample consists of 167 bargain purchase acquisitions10. Table 2.1 presents the 
sample selection and a breakdown of the number of acquisitions taken by BPG firms. 74% of 
BPG firms were involved in single acquisition within one firm-year, suggesting that acquiring 
firms are not randomly choosing to perform bargain purchase transactions. 
      To construct a control group, I use I-Metrix to search for and hand collect acquisitions with 
goodwill recognized. The control sample consists of 167 goodwill acquisitions matched with 
BPG acquisitions by two-digit SIC industry code of acquiring firms, size, and calendar year. I 
denote the BPGs of these observations as zero. 
      Table 2.2, Panel A reports the distribution of bargain purchase acquisitions and BPG firms by 
calendar year. As the revised accounting guidance became effective for acquisitions completed 
                                                          
9 In my sample, 73.5% of targets are private firms. Their data is obtained from PrivCO, a premier source for 
business and financial data on non-publicly traded corporations.  
10 I have acquisition data for 167 bargain purchase transactions. The regression of BPG requires the targets’ financial 
data to be included as controls. Around 84% of the targets are private firms and 36.8% are excluded with missing 




during annual reporting periods that begin on or after December 15, 2008, the occurrence of 
bargain purchase acquisitions is spreading over the sample period after 2008. Panel B indicates 
that the frequency of bargain purchase acquisitions is spread evenly throughout the year, without 
concentration in each one quarter. Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) has documented that 
earnings management transactions are more likely to occur within the last few days of the quarter. 
But I don’t observe a higher frequency of bargain purchase acquisitions in the 4th quarter of the 
year. A potential explanation is that acquiring firms normally take several months to finalize the 
fair valuation of assets acquired and liability assumed. For example, they could complete the 
acquisition in the first quarter, but finalize the fair value estimation and determine the amount of 
BPG in the last quarter based on their earnings performance in current year. This is still 
consistent with my story that acquiring firms are using their discretions to determine BPGs. 
Panel C describes the industry composition and shows that approximately half (43.63%) of the 
bargain purchase acquisitions are performed by financial institutions. As most bank acquisitions 
are assisted by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and there are other factors in 
particular driving the occurrence and recognition of BPGs, I focus on other industries which take 
56.37% of bargain purchase acquisitions in my sample.    
      Table 3.3 represents the descriptive statistic for BPGs, earnings, and fair value variables for 
BPG acquisitions and GDWL acquisitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1%. As we can see, there are several notable differences between BPG acquisitions and 
GDWL acquisitions. For BPG acquisitions, the mean (median) BPG is 1.94 (0.43) percent of 
prior year’s total assets. NI is defined as net income before taxes, deflated by average assets. 
NIBB is defined as net income before taxes and BPGs, deflated by average assets. The mean 




ΔNIBB is denoted as the change in NIBB from the current year to previous year. The mean 
(median) ΔNIBB is -0.0151 (-0.0077) for BPG group, 0.0053 (0.002) for GDWL group. The 
results show that before excluding the effect of BPGs, the average earnings performance of BPG 
firms (0.0482) is not significantly different from GDWL firms (0.0546). But after excluding the 
effect of BPGs, both NIBB and change in NIBB are significantly lower for BPG group than 
GDWL group, indicating the weaker earnings performance of BPG group without the 
recognition of BPGs. 
      Intangible is defined as level-3 fair value of intangible assets acquired, deflated by fair value 
of total assets acquired. Consistent with my expectation, fair value of intangible assets acquired 
represents a significant portion of total assets acquired both for bargain purchase acquisitions 
(18.02%) and goodwill acquisitions (34.89%). The Intangible is significantly larger for goodwill 
acquisitions than bargain purchase acquisitions. Because intangible assets are key value drivers 
in a business combination, the interpretation of the results could be firms that engaged in 
goodwill acquisitions allocate a larger proportion of purchase price over intangible assets to 
convince its board and investor that the overpayment is reasonable. The financial performance of 
targets in BPG acquisitions is significantly weaker than that in goodwill acquisitions. Target_roa 
is defined as the target’s ROA in the year preceding the acquisition. The mean (median) 
Target_roa is -0.104 (-0.0154) for bargain purchase acquisitions, and 0.1042 (0.046) for goodwill 
acquisitions, indicating a potential explanation for the occurrence of bargain purchase 
acquisitions: acquiring firms are paying lower purchase price for targets with weaker financial 
performance. I address this explanation by adding control variable in regressions. 




      2.6.1 Earnings Smoothing 
     2.6.1.1 The association between BPG and NIBB 
      Following Haw, Jung, and Lilien (1991), I analyze the time-series trend of earnings 
performance of BPG firms in comparison to that of control firms. This analysis tests why bargain 
purchase acquisition is undertaken in a particular year. Table 2.4 presents the mean and median 
values of earnings per share (EPS) and return on equity (ROE) over the years from t=-3 through 
t=+1 (t=0 if the BPG year). The z-statistic represents Wilcoxon singed ranks z-value for the 
change in earning variable between the current and the preceding year.  
      Both EPS and ROE perform a consistent pattern of earnings behavior. The median EPS for 
BPG firms ranges from $0.39 to $0.71 and increases steadily from year -3 to year 0. In the 
transaction year, the median EPS would have dropped to $0.4804 from $0.57 in the preceding 
year if I exclude the effect of BPG. The median EPS is $0.70 in the year following bargain 
purchase acquisition, which is close to prior year’s level. The analysis of the ROE variable is 
similar to that of EPS. The BPG firms generally show increasing pattern over the period. In the 
transaction year, the ROE excluding BPG is lower than that of the preceding year, while the 
increasing trend remains if BPG is included. Control firms generally show increasing trend in 
EPS and stable pattern in ROE over the same period. This table suggests that the drop in earnings 
of BPG firms before BPG is transitory, and BPG firms undertake bargain purchase acquisitions 
to offset earnings decline.   
      Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 reveal the visualization of acquiring firms’ earnings pattern. I plot 
the time-series of net income versus net income excluding the effect of BPGs in event-time over 




2.1 shows the time series of average NI versus NIBB, while Figure 2.2 plots the time-series of 
25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of NI versus NIBB. The NI is denoted by solid line, whereas the 
denoted NIBB is joined by dotted line. 
      H1 hypothesizes that the recognition of BPGs as ordinary income provides opportunity for 
acquiring managers to manage earnings. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 present supporting evidence 
that acquiring managers are using the amount of BPGs reported to smooth an unexpected and 
transitory decrease in their year-to-year earnings. For the average and all three percentiles 
reported, the time-series of firms’ NI exhibits a transitory decrease in the transaction year when 
the BPGs are excluded. NI in the transaction year is much closer to earnings one year prior and 
one year behind if BPGs are included than if BPGs are excluded. Moreover, the yearly average 
NIBB in the BPG year is the lowest over the entire seven-year period. This is consistent with the 
proposition that time-series of yearly earnings would have transitorily decreased in the 
transaction year if BPGs had not been included. 
      Table 2.5 presents the results of contingency table analysis, which provides supporting 
evidence for the proposition that manager’s incentives are relatively strong when NIBB is low. 
The frequency of BPGs higher than median is significantly lower in positive NIBB subsample 
than that in negative NIBB subsample (χ2=24.75, P<0.001), suggesting that acquiring firms are 
more likely to report larger BPGs with negative earnings before BPGs. 
      Table 2.6 investigates the relationship between BPGs and the incentive to manage earnings 
and shows the standard OLS results of model (1). In regression (1), I assume that the entire 
amount of BPGs is discretionary. Consistent with H1, the coefficient on NIBBi,t is statistically 




excluding BPGs are lower. Regression (2) includes various controls to isolate the discretionary 
component of BPGs. The coefficient on NIBBi,t is still significantly negative (-0.0910; P<0.01), 
and the negative association between BPGs and NIBB holds in censored regressions.11  
Specifically, the estimated coefficient on target_roa is insignificant across all regressions, 
indicating that the target’s financial distress is not the main source for BPGs. 
      In Table 2.7, I split the full sample into positive NIBB subsample and negative NIBB 
subsample. The OLS estimation shows that the coefficient on NIBB is insignificant (-0.0123; 
P>0.1) in positive NIBB subsample, which contains 195 observations. On the contrary, the 
coefficient on NIBB is negative and significant (-0.1479, P<0.1) in negative NIBB subsample, 
suggesting that firms with negative earnings before BPGs are driving the association between 
BPGs and NIBB. This result is consistent with our assumption that firms have relatively strong 
incentive to report larger BPGs when the net income before BPG is below zero. 
      2.6.1.2 The association between BPG and ΔNIBB 
        Following Hand (1989), I graph the time-series of changes in net income versus changes in 
net income before BPGs. Figure 3 shows the time-series comparison of average ΔNI versus 
ΔNIBB, while Figure 4 plots the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of ΔNI versus ΔNIBB. It is 
hypothesized that acquiring managers’ motivations are stronger when NIBB is below prior year’s 
level. Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 shows that the average change in NIBB is slightly negative, but 
becomes positive after BPGs are conducted, as well as the median and 25th percentile change in 
NIBB. This supports my prediction that acquiring firms will suffer a transitory drop in earnings 
if BPGs are excluded. 
                                                          
11 As the BPG of goodwill acquisition is denoted as zero, the depended variables are censored. I include a censored 
regression model in addition to OSL regression to validate my results. In untabulated analysis, I also adopt the Tobit 




      Next, I employ a contingency table analysis to investigate the distribution of BPGs. Table 2.8 
presents that the positive change in NIBB implies a greater proportion of BPGs lower than the 
median, while the negative change in NIBB implies a greater proportion of BPGs higher than the 
median. The difference between two subsamples is statistically significant (χ2=9.28; P<0.05), 
indicating that acquiring firms are likely to report larger BPGs when the change in NIBB is 
negative. 
      Lastly, I use the change in NIBB as managers’ incentive to manipulate earnings and report 
the results of model (2) for full sample in Table 2.9. As I predict, the coefficient on ΔNIBB is 
negative and significant at 1% level (-0.1807; P<0.01), where I assume the entire amount of 
BPGs is discretionary. The negative association between BPGs and ΔNIBB is also significant 
when adding various controls and in censored regressions. Thus, larger BPGs are recognized 
when the changes in NIBB are lower, consistent with my earnings management hypothesis. 
      Table 2.10 shows the OLS regression results of model (2) for positive ΔNIBB and negative 
ΔNIBB subsamples. The negative coefficient on change in NIBB is significant (-0.3174; P<0.01) 
only in negative ΔNIBB subsample, while it becomes insignificant in positive ΔNIBB subsample. 
The results in Table 2.10 suggest that acquiring firms with increasing NIBB are not strongly 
motivated to use BPGs to smooth earnings, whereas acquiring firms experience an earnings 
decline likely to report larger BPGs to avoid it. 
    2.6.2 The association between the intensity of earnings management and the fair value of 
intangible assets 
      Table 2.11 shows the results of augment model (1) and (2) with a term that control for level-3 




interaction with NIBB. If intangible assets are valued for smoothing purposes, the coefficient on 
the interactive term should be negative and significant, denoting increased earnings management 
obtained from acquiring higher proportions of intangible assets. The results validate my 
prediction for the sample of bargain purchase acquisitions. The coefficient on the interaction is -
0.2064 (P<0.01) in regression (2), and -0.1958 (P<0.01) in regression (3) with various controls 
added. 
      It is possible that firms self-select to take bargain purchase acquisitions. To address the 
econometric issue, I employ the Heckman two-stage model as an additional test for H3. Table 
2.12 presents the results of my estimation of the probit regression described in Equation (5). In 
predicting the choice to take bargain purchase acquisitions, the coefficient on Decline is 
significantly positive (0.3661; P<0.1), indicating that acquirers recognizing BPGs are 
experiencing larger incidence of earnings decline. Number of acquisitions performed by 
acquirers is negatively related to the probability of BPG (-0.8879; P<0.01), supporting that 
acquirers are not randomly engaging in a bargain purchase transaction when performing multiple 
acquisitions. I also find that acquiring firms that pay cash as purchase consideration (-0.3769; 
P<0.05) and allocate less fair value to intangible assets (-1.3021; P<0.001) are more likely to 
recognize BPGs. The latter result confirms the argument in Shalev et al. (2013): acquiring firms 
that take goodwill acquisitions allocate more purchase price over intangible assets to convince its 
board and investor that they are not overpaying for the target. 12   
      Table 2.13 present the estimates from regression of BPGs on explanatory variables. This 
specification includes the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) from stage-one model, which controls for 
potential self-selection bias in the second stage. The coefficient on the IMR is statistically 
                                                          




significant (-0.0199; P<0.05), indicating the importance to control for sample selection bias. The 
significant and negative coefficient on NIIBB (-0.0788; P<0.05) still holds, consistent with my 
hypothesis that acquirers are reporting larger BPGs when the earnings performance before BPGs 
is worse. Level-3 fair value estimates of intangibles acquired are associated with a larger amount 
of BPG (0.0474; P<0.001), while the interaction term is negatively associated with BPGs 
(0.01946; P<0.001). The results validate my prediction that acquirers are optimistically 
estimating level-3 fair values of intangibles to manage earnings: the higher level-3 fair value 
estimates of intangibles acquired, the more intense earnings management activities are carried 
out in bargain purchase acquisitions.  
2.6.3 Additional analysis 
      2.6.3.1 Future amortization and impairment 
      Managing earnings by reporting BPGs is not costless, because over-optimism in fair 
valuation of intangibles in current year will have to be reversed in future years. Thus, I expect 
that firms perform bargain purchase acquisitions experience an increase in amortization and 
write-off for intangibles in following years. Compustat reports the amortization expense which 
excludes write-off of intangibles, and impairment which includes impairment of goodwill and 
intangibles. I perform a time-series analysis of amortization and impairment and report the 
Wilcoxon singed ranks z-value for the change in variables between current and the preceding 
year.  
      The evidence in Table 2.14 is consistent with my proposition. Panel A shows that both BPG 
firms and GDWL firms are reporting significantly larger impairment in the three years following 




intangibles by using the data from Compustat. But given the notion that 74% of BPG firms 
perform single acquisition within one firm year, I predict that BPG firms realize increased 
likelihood of future impairment primarily as a result of writing up intangibles rather than 
acquiring goodwill. Analyzing the sum of amortization and impairment for two groups, Panel C 
confirms the increasing pattern for BPG firms and the stable trend for GDWL firms. For BPG 
firms, the amortization and impairment increase from year -1 through year +3. The changes are 
statistically significant at 5% level over the sample period. For GDWL firms, the same variable 
increases significantly from year -1 to the acquisition year, but is not significantly different from 
the preceding year over the remaining sample period. By performing the time-series analysis, I 
find that only BPG firms recognize larger amortization and impairment of intangibles in years 
following acquisitions, highlighting the potential cost of their earnings management practices. 
    2.6.3.2 Stock returns and future performance 
  The analysis in the previous sections supports my hypothesis that acquirers are using BPGs to 
manage earnings. In this section, I investigate how the market reacts to announcement of a firm’s 
acquisition completion and whether this reaction differs depending on the type of acquisitions. 
For each group, I measure the acquirers’ abnormal stock return in the announcement period and a 
year after the announcement. AB_RET is measured using a Fama and French (1996) three-factor 
model over a three day window centered on the announcement date (-1, +1) and from the day of 
the announcement to 250 trading days after the announcement (0, +250).  
   Table 2.15 shows that the mean abnormal return is insignificant for both bargain purchase 
acquisitions and goodwill acquisitions over the three day window (-1, +1), suggesting that both 




types of acquisitions. In a long horizon (0, +250), I find bargain purchase acquisitions suffer an 
insignificant positive stock market reaction (1.20%), whereas goodwill acquisitions have a 
significant and negative stock market reaction (-6.41%) one year after the announcement date. 
The difference between the two reactions (7.61%) is statistically significant at the 10% level. On 
one hand, these results indicate that market reacts negatively to the announcement of goodwill 
acquisitions, consistent with prior literature that investors considers overpayment in goodwill 
acquisitions as bad news (Shalev, 2013). On the other hand, firms perform bargain purchase 
acquisitions suffer no negative market reaction, suggesting that bargain purchase is not viewed as 
bad news by investors. 
2.7 Conclusions 
      Revised FASB ASC 805, Business Combinations, provides the conditions required for 
bargain purchase amount to be treated as ordinary earnings. In business acquisitions where fair 
value estimates of net identifiable assets acquired exceeds purchase price, the excess amount is 
recorded as a day one gain in income statement. 
      In this chapter, I hypothesize that BPGs have consistently been used for earnings 
management purposes in non-financial industries. My sample consists of 167 bargain purchase 
acquisitions and 167 goodwill acquisitions from 2008 through 2012. The results show that 
reported BPGs are larger when net income before BPGs are low or below prior year’s level, 
suggesting that the revised accounting stander opens door to acquiring firms to manage earnings 
by reporting bargain purchase gains as ordinary income. I point out that acquiring managers have 
considerable discretion over judgments of level-3 fair value estimates, which is the mechanics 




intangible assets are positively associated with the intensity of earnings management. The result 
holds after the control of sample selection by using Heckman two-stage model, and shows that 
the flexibility available in fair value accounting provides opportunities for managers to make 
discretionary estimates in acquisitions. 
  In additional test, I provide evidence that acquiring firms involved with bargain purchase 
acquisitions recognize more amortization and write-off of intangibles in following years, figuring 
out the potential cost of earnings management through discretionary fair value estimation. 
However, investors in market consider the underpayment in acquisitions is not a bad news and 
do not react negatively to bargain purchase acquisitions.  
  With changes introduced by FASB ASC 805, the financial statement effects and the reasons for 
such bargain purchase transactions are not particularly clear. My research provides new insights 
into the revised accounting standards for bargain purchase acquisitions and raises questions 
about the appropriateness of judgments used in determining level-3 fair value estimation. This 
study suggests that investors, analysts or auditors should pay attention to firms performed 
bargain purchase transactions, as those firms are likely to intentionally bias fair value 










Table 2.1  
Panel A: Sample Selection: Non-financial Industries 
   Bargain purchase acquisitions completed between 2008 and 2012 
 
412 
Excluding financial and regulated sectors 
 
204 
Excluding missing COMPUSTAT data 
 
41 
Excluding missing acquisition data from Form 10-K and PrivCo 
 
66 
Final sample   101 
   Panel B: A Breakdown of the Number of Acquisitions within One firm-year 
For BPG firms1: 
  Number of acquisitions within one firm-year 
 






















Total   1672 
1. BPG firms represent firms perform at least one bargain purchase acquisition within one firm-year. 
2. These 167 acquirers account for 243 acquisitions completed between 2008 and 2012, including 167 bargain 
purchase acquisitions and 76 goodwill acquisitions. 















Distribution of Bargain Purchase Acquisitions: All Industries 
Panel A: By Calendar Year 
    2008   2009   2010 
 
2011   2012 
  
  
    
    

































Percent   0.93%   25.31%   29.01%   26.85%   17.90% 
Panel B: By Quarter 
 
  1st 
 
2nd   3rd   4th   Total  
# of BPG acquisitions 
 







Percent   24.01%   23.20%   25.81%   26.88%   100% 
Panel C: By Industry Frequency 
        
# of 
  SIC code 
  
SIC name acquisitions 
 
Frequency  
60   Depository Institutions 161   43.63% 
36 
 









































































































































































































Social Services 1 
 
0.27% 








Descriptive Statistics: Non-financial Industries  
Panel A: Bargain Purchase Acquisitions  

























































































Payment 125  1.2480  1.0000  0.5910  1.0000  1.0000 
            Panel B: Goodwill Acquisitions  

























































































Payment 135   1.2593   1.0000   0.5854   1.0000   1.0000 
  
***, **, and * indicate the difference between the bargain purchase acquisitions and goodwill acquisitions is significant at p<0.001, 
p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively, based on two-tailed tests 
                                                          











BPGain = bargain purchase gains deflated by average total assets; 
NIBB = net income before taxes and bargain purchase gains, deflated by average total assets; 
ΔNIBB = the change in net income before taxes and bargain purchase gains, deflated by average total assets; 
NI= acquirer's net income before taxes, deflated by average total assets; 
Intangible = level-3 fair value of intangible assets acquired, deflated by fair value of total assets acquired; 
Acquirer_z-score = acquirer's altman z-score in the year preceding the acquisition; 
Target_roa = target's ROA in the year preceding the acquisition; 
Relsize = the ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size in the year preceding the acquisition; 








Time-series Analysis of Earnings Variables for BPG Firms versus GDWL Firms  
  
Relative years to acquisition (year 0) 
  
-3 -2 -1 0a 0b 1 
Variable Sample Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median Mean  Median 
EPS BPG firms 0.2152 0.3900 0.5641 0.3800 0.8017 0.5700 0.5913 0.4804 1.0752 0.7100 1.046 0.7000 
 
z-value 
























              
 
GDWL firms  0.6465 0.3850 0.9591 0.6450 1.0896 0.8000 
  
1.2769 1.1800 1.7196 1.4200 
 
z-value 








  n   103 
 
143   158 
  






    
  
      
  
    
ROE BPG firms -0.0221 0.0669 0.0791 0.0724 0.0604 0.0832 0.0209 0.0800 0.0825 0.0960 0.0932 0.0988 
 
z-value 
























              
 
GDWL firms  0.0828 0.0865 0.0923 0.1019 0.0967 0.1003 
  
0.0858 0.0920 0.0852 0.0963 
 
z-value 








  n   103   143   158       165   130 
              a The year of acquisition when BPGs are excluded. 
b The year of acquisition when BPGs are included. 
EPS = primary earnings per share excluding extraordinary items. 
ROE = income before taxes, deflated by prior year equity. 
Z-value = Wilcoxon signed ranks z-value for the change in the earnings variable between the current and the preceding year. 



















































Event Year Relative to the BPG Year ("0")
25th percentile of NI
25th percentile of NIBB
50th percentile of NI
50th percentile of NIBB
75th percentile of NI







Tabulation and Comparison of Positive NIBB group  
and Negative NIBB group 
  
  High_BPGain Low_BPGain Total 
Positive NIBB 55 77 132 
Negative NIBB 29 6 35 
Total 84 83 167 
    
χ2=24.75; Probability of a χ2 greater than or equal to 24.75 under the null hypothesis 
that amount of BPGs and sign of NIBB are independent is less than 0.001. 
Variable Definitions: 
High_BPGain denotes the observation that BPGs are above the median. 
Low_BPGain denotes the observation that BPGs are below the median. 











Table 2.6  
Regressions Examining the Relation between Bargain Purchase Gains and Earnings Levels 
  
Model: BPGaini,t=αi,t + β1 NIBBi,t + Controls + εi,t 

















































   
-0.0006** 
   
-0.0002 
    
(-2.02) 
   
(-0.48) 
Target_roa 
   
0.0001 
   
0.0007 
    
(0.84) 
   
(0.40) 
Relsize 
   
-0.0007 
   
-0.0027 
    
(-0.94) 
   
(-0.70) 
Payment 
   
0.0047 
   
0.0042 
    
(1.46) 











Adjusted R2 (LR Chi2)  0.2486  0.2863  58.76  46.95 
***, **, and * indicate significance at p<0.001, p<0.05 and p<0.1, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
Variable Definitions: 
i=acquisition index; t=year index for 2008-2012; 
BPGain = bargain purchase gains deflated by prior year assets; 
NIBB = net income before taxes and bargain purchase gain, deflated by average assets; 
Acquirer_z-score= acquirer's altman z-score in the year preceding the acquisition; 
Target_roa = target's ROA in the year preceding the acquisition; 
Relsize = the ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size in the year preceding the acquisition; 








Regressions Examining the Relation between Bargain Purchase Gains and Earnings Levels 
  
Model: BPGaini,t=αi,t+β1 NIBBi,t+βi Controlsi,t-1 +εi,t 

















































   
-0.0008 
   
-0.0004 
    
(-1.62) 
   
(-1.22) 
Target_roa 
   
0.0004 
   
0.024 
    
(0.47) 
   
(1.43) 
Relsize 
   
0.0008 
   
-0.0243 
    
(1.45) 
   
(-0.27) 
Payment 
   
0.0058** 
   
0.0044 
    
(2.24) 











Adjusted R2   0.0016  0.1521  0.1988  0.2005 
***, **, and * indicate significance at p<0.001, p<0.05 and p<0.1, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
Variable Definitions: 
i=acquisition index; t=year index for 2008-2012; 
BPGain = bargain purchase gains deflated by prior year assets; 
NIBB = net income before taxes and bargain purchase gains, deflated by average assets; 
Acquirer_z-score= acquirer's altman z-score in the year preceding the acquisition; 
Target_roa = target's ROA in the year preceding the acquisition; 
Relsize = the ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size in the year preceding the acquisition; 










Time-Series Comparison in Event-Time of the 25th, 50th, and 75th Percentiles of ΔNI versus 












































Event Year Relative to the BPG Year ("0")
25th percentile of ΔNI 
25th percentile of ΔNIBB
50th percentile of ΔNI
50th percentile of ΔNIBB
75th percentile of ΔNI





Tabulation and Comparison of Positive ΔNIBB group  
and Negative ΔNIBB group 
  
  High_BPGain Low_BPGain Total 
Positive ΔNIBB 37 56 93 
Negative ΔNIBB 47 27 74 
Total 84 83 167 
    
χ2=9.28; Probability of a χ2 greater than or equal to 9.28 under the null hypothesis 
that amount of BPGs and sign of ΔNIBB are independent is less than 0.005. 
Variable Definitions: 
High_BPGain denotes the observation that BPGs are above the median. 
Low_BPGain denotes the observation that BPGs are below the median. 
ΔNIBB equals the changes in net income before taxes and bargain purchase gains,  








Regressions Examining the Relation Between Bargain Purchase Gains and Earnings Changes 
Model: BPGaini,t=αi,t+β1 ΔNIBBi,t+ Controlsi,t-1 +εi,t 

















































   
-0.0009*** 
   
-0.0007 
    
(-4.03) 
   
(-1.77) 
Target_roa 
   
0.0003 
   
0.0011 
    
(0.22) 
   
(0.57) 
Relsize 
   
-0.0081 
   
-0.0018 
    
(-0.68) 
   
(-0.28) 
Payment 
   
0.0061** 
   
0.0066 
    
(2.09) 











Adjusted R2 (LR Chi2)  0.2957  0.39  71.6  70.83 
***, **, and * indicate significance at p<0.001, p<0.05 and p<0.1, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
Variable Definitions: 
i=acquisition index; t=year index for 2008-2012; 
BPGain = bargain purchase gains deflated by prior year’s assets; 
ΔNIBB = the change in net income before taxes and bargain purchase gains, deflated by average assets; 
Acquirer_z-score= acquirer's altman z-score in the year preceding the acquisition. 
Target_roa = target's ROA in the year preceding the acquisition. 
Relsize = the ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size in the year preceding the acquisition. 









Regressions Examining the Relation between Bargain Purchase Gains and Earnings Changes 
Model: BPGaini,t=αi,t+β1 ΔNIBBi,t+βi Controlsi,t-1 +εi,t 

















































   
-0.0007 
   
-0.0005 
    
(-1.07) 
   
(-1.44) 
Target_roa 
   
-0.0001 
   
0.0088 
    
(-0.04) 
   
(0.43) 
Relsize 
   
-0.0083 
   
0.0107 
    
(-0.49) 
   
(1.54) 
Payment 
   
-0.001 
   
0.0016 
    
(-1.07) 











Adjusted R2   0.005  0.0168  0.4354  0.5008 
***, **, and * indicate significance at p<0.001, p<0.05 and p<0.1, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
Variable Definitions: 
i=acquisition index; t=year index for 2008-2012; 
BPGain = bargain purchase gains deflated by prior year’s assets; 
ΔNIBB = the change in net income before taxes and bargain purchase gains, deflated by average assets; 
Acquirer_z-score= acquirer's altman z-score in the year preceding the acquisition. 
Target_roa = target's ROA in the year preceding the acquisition. 
Relsize = the ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size in the year preceding the acquisition. 





Earnings Management as a Function of Fair Value of Intangible Assets Acquired: 
BPG Subsample 

































































































Adjusted R2    0.4294   0.6812   0.7151 
***, **, and * indicate significance at p<0.001, p<0.05 and p<0.1, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
Variable Definitions: 
i=acquisition index; t=year index for 2008-2012; 
BPGain = bargain purchase gains deflated by prior year assets; 
NIBB = net income before taxes and bargain purchase gains, deflated by average assets; 
 
Intangible = level-3 fair value of intangible assets acquired, deflated by fair value of total assets acquired; 
Acquirer_z-score= acquirer's altman z-score in the year preceding the acquisition; 
Target_roa = target's ROA in the year preceding the acquisition; 
Relsize = the ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size in the year preceding the acquisition; 







Table 2.12  
Heckman two-stage model: Probit Regression of the Choice to Take Bargain Purchase Acquisitions 
Model: Probit(Choicei,t)= α+β1 Acquirer_sizei,t-1+β2 Acquiree_sizei,t-1+β3 Lossi,t+β4 Declinei,t+β5 Number_acqi,t 
+β6 Q4i,t +β7 Paymenti,t + β8 Intangiblei,t +εi,t 






































































       Number of observations 
     
227 
LR chi2 (8) 
     
70.43 
Pseudo R2           0.2252 
***, **, and * indicate significance at p<0.001, p<0.05 and p<0.1, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
Variable Definitions: 
Choice = 1 if the acquiring firm takes a bargain purchase acquisition, and 0 otherwise; 
Acquirer_size = the natural logarithm of acquiring firm's total assets; 
Acquiree_size = the natural logarithm of target's total assets; 
Loss = 1 if the net income before bargain purchase gains is negative, and 0 otherwise; 
Decline = 1 if the ROA before bargain purchase gains is lower that prior year's ROA, and 0 otherwise; 
Number_acq = the natural logarithm of the number of acquisitions performed by the acquiring firm; 
Q4 = 1 if the acquisition occurred in the 4th quarter, and 0 otherwise; 
Payment = 1 if paid by cash, =2 if paid by the combination of cash and stock, =3 if paid by stock; 







       
       Table 2.13 
Heckman two-stage model: OLS Regression of Bargain Purchase Gains 
Model: BPGaini,t= α+β1 NIBBi,t +β2 Intangiblei,t +β3 Interactioni,t + β4 Relsizei,t-1 + β5 Altmani,t-1 + β6 Paymenti,t + β7 
IMRi,t + εi,t 































































       Number of observations 
     
100 
Adjusted R2           0.7123 
***, **, and * indicate significance at p<0.001, p<0.05 and p<0.1, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
Variable Definitions: 
BPGain = bargain purchase gains deflated by prior year assets; 
NIBB = net income before taxes and bargain purchase gains, deflated by average assets; 
Intangible = level-3 fair value of intangible assets acquired, deflated by fair value of total assets acquired; 
Relsize = the ratio of the target's asset size to the acquirer's assets size in the year preceding the acquisition; 
Acquirer_z-score= acquirer's altman z-score in the year preceding the acquisition; 
Payment = 1 if paid by cash, =2 if paid by the combination of cash and stock, =3 if paid by stock; 








Time-series Analysis of Amortization and Impairment for BPG Firms versus GDWL Firms 
  
-1 0 1 2 3 
Variable Sample Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Impair14 BPG firms 0.1245 0 0.0854 0 0.0356 0 0.0614 0 0.1076 0 
 
z-value 
   














GDWL firms 0.0693 0 0.1622 0 0.0653 0 0.0839 0 0.0849 0 
 
z-value 
   













            Amor15 BPG firms 0.2076 0.1267 0.2648 0.1358 0.1684 0.1155 0.1549 0.1176 0.1626 0.1135 
 
z-value 
   
2.157** 
 














GDWL firms  0.2385 0.1477 0.2788 0.1583 0.1585 0.1297 0.1524 0.1141 0.1547 0.1211 
 
z-value 
   
1.662* 
 













            Amor_Impair BPG firms 0.2812 0.0416 0.2164 0.0531 0.0942 0.0489 0.1015 0.0479 0.1234 0.0535 
 
z-value 





















GDWL firms  0.1779 0.0446 0.1456 0.0631 0.1025 0.0574 0.1115 0.0486 0.1045 0.0529 
 
z-value 




















Impair = acquiring firm's impairment of goodwill, deflated by prior year's goodwill. 
Amortization = acquiring firm's amortization expense of intangible assets, deflated by prior year's intangible assets. 
Amor_Impair = acquiring firm's amortization expense and impairment, deflated by prior year's intangible assets and goodwill. 
Z-value = Wilcoxon signed ranks z-value for the change in variable between the current and the preceding year. 
                                                          
14 Impairment variable obtained from COMPUSTAT includes the impairment of goodwill and write-off of unamortized intangible assets. 








Stock Performance for BPG Group and GDWL Group 
















































         ΔROAt 






        
(t=1.4127) 
ΔROAt+1 






                (t=0.9297) 
Variable Definitions: 
AB_RET = abnormal stock return around the announcement date of acquisition completion. 
ΔROAt = change in ROA from year t to year t+1.  








A Bargain Purchase Acquisition Example in Non-Financial Industries  
The business combination disclosure in the 10-K of Plures Technologies Incorporated on December 31, 2011: 
The allocation of the purchase price and the purchase price accounting is based on the fair value of the acquired assets and liabilities 
measured as of May 23, 2011 in accordance with ASC Topic 805, Business Combinations. 
Fair value of shares of common stock issued to AMS   $ 385,000   
Advances to AMS including interest (obligation to repay released at closing of 
merger)  
  1,707,326 
 





     
Estimated Allocation of Purchase Price: 
    




































Gain on bargain purchase 
 
  (1,652,523) 
 










          
The gain related to the acquisition of AMS Inc. assets and liabilities in the amount $1,652,523 was recorded in other income in the 
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